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## EROS AND MILITARY COMMAND IN XENOPHON

Xenophon's concern with morality in his more philosophical writings is evident. But (as Vivienne Gray has recently argued)<sup>1</sup> that concern embraces also his approach to history. In the *Hellenica* this interest in morality is not to be written off as a matter of marginal comment, but, it may be claimed, is integral to the historian's purpose. He is one for whom the determinants of history are (under the gods) the personalities and actions of great (and not so great) men, and it is natural for him to observe the interaction between personal morality and political and military actions. It is from this standpoint that the present article seeks to illustrate from Xenophon's writings one aspect of his outlook on these matters, – the role of self-control (or lack of it) over homoerotic desire in the context of military history. How far we can go behind his text to determine 'what actually happened' or use his testimony in developing a wider understanding of *erōs* in classical Greece at large are matters for further enquiry.

Xenophon's manifold writings contain an intriguing variety of anecdotes and narratives reflecting erotic relationships between men, and philosophical or ethical discussion about the nature of such affairs. While in the more philosophical writings Xenophon reports Socrates as expressing quite rigorist views, it appears from many of the stories narrated in the historical books that the writer is quite comfortable in recognizing such relationships as a natural part of social life, and not infrequently he implies approval.<sup>2</sup> In military matters, a positive view of the relationship between *erastēs* and *erōmenos* is based on the belief that the presence of his *erōmenos* will inspire a man to valour and, through shame, save him from cowardice. This explanation, put into the mouth of Pausanias 'lover of Agathon' in the 8th chapter of Xenophon's *Symposium*, is immediately rejected by Socrates. Yet Xenophon himself evinces some sympathy for it, when, quite parenthetically, in the treatise *On Hunting*, he takes it as self-evident that 'when any man is within sight of his *erōmenos* he excels himself and avoids saying or doing things which are base or cowardly so that he may not be seen by him'.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, elsewhere in the *Symposium* Xenophon allows Kritoboulos to give an enthusiastic exposition of the principle, and go on to declare that it is madness not to elect handsome men as generals.<sup>4</sup> No doubt some allowance must be made here for dramatic effect, yet the 'Sacred Band' of Thebes was famously organized on the basis of erotic relationships, and as Sir Kenneth Dover has pointed out, the story of Episthenes in Xenophon's *Anabasis* reflects the same belief in stiffening a fighting force with the powerful bonds of *erōs*. The historian himself, it will be remembered, intervened on behalf of this lover of boys and the young man he was seeking to save from execution, and spoke to Seuthes, the local ruler in whose service he then was, sympathetically of the company of fighting youths whom Episthenes had raised, chosen on the basis of their good looks.<sup>5</sup> Even among the

<sup>1</sup> Vivienne Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* (London, 1989). Cf. G. L. Cawkwell, Introduction to *Xenophon: A History of My Times* (Harmondsworth, 1979), pp. 43–6.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.1.40, 4.8.39, *Anabasis* 4.6.1–3, *Hiero* 1.29–38. *Anab.* 5.8.4. presupposes that quarrels over *paidika* were to be expected in army life.

<sup>3</sup> Xenophon, *Cynegeticus* 12.20.

<sup>4</sup> Xenophon, *Symposium* 4.15–16.

<sup>5</sup> *Anab.* 7.4.7–11. Cf. K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (London, 1978), pp. 51f, and p. 192.

Spartans, who did not as a matter of policy station lovers together in battle, we find a general, Anaxibios, being faithfully attended by his *paidika* as he courted death on the battlefield.<sup>6</sup>

We may conclude that not only did Xenophon accept the practice of pederasty as a part of life, but that he also recognized the potential of the feelings it aroused to prompt nobility and valour. There is, however, a converse possibility – and one which alarmed Xenophon – that erotic desire might threaten to interfere with the performance of one's military or civic duty, particularly on the part of a man set in authority. Against this destructive *erōs* he sets the virtue of self-control (*enkrateia*), and it is the relationship between these principles, particularly in the exercise of military command, which I wish to examine in more detail in Xenophon's writings.

Self-control for Xenophon does not exclude the satisfaction of bodily needs, but it makes a man the master of such desires, not their slave. Nor is this virtue invoked only in respect of sexual matters. For sexual desire, whether for men or women, is only one of a list of bodily appetites which recurs in one form or another at several points in the *Memorabilia* and elsewhere, and over which the truly good man is expected to exercise self-control – in matters of food and drink, sex, sleep, devotion to work and the disregard of extremes of heat and cold.<sup>7</sup> This aspect of morality is summed up most graphically in Xenophon's retelling of the fable (attributed to Prodikos) of Herakles' choice between Virtue (*Aretē*) and Vice (*Kakia*, also, and interestingly, termed *Eudaimonia*), who, personified as women, set out their alternative life-styles before the hero as he enters upon manhood.<sup>8</sup> Vice offers a life of pleasure, in which Herakles need not concern himself with weighty matters of war and public affairs, but may plan his life around the choice of whatever will delight him by way of the senses, including the love of boys. Nor need he be too scrupulous about the means employed to attain these ends. With this is contrasted the path of Virtue, whose goal (to be a worthy doer of fine and noble deeds) cannot be achieved without toil and effort. After Virtue and Vice have each outlined their prospectuses, Virtue goes on to berate Vice for the more specific sins which the latter's offer entails. She (Virtue) combines two themes: that Vice requires one to make elaborate preparations for the heightening of pleasure, thus (by implication) wasting effort that should be spent on higher things; and that one is then led into excess, not waiting for appetite to arise naturally, but taking one's fill of all things before desire supervenes.<sup>9</sup> This requires the elaborate preparation of sophisticated dishes, snow-chilled wines and the like, to stimulate the jaded appetite. In the case of sexual desire, these themes are expressed in the following words, in which Virtue addresses Vice:

τὰ δ' ἀφροδίσια πρὸ τοῦ δεῖσθαι ἀναγκάζεις, πάντα μηχανωμένη καὶ γυναιξὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι χρωμένη· οὕτω γὰρ παιδεύεις τοὺς σεαυτῆς φίλους, τῆς μὲν νυκτὸς ὑβρίζουσα, τῆς δ' ἡμέρας τὸ χρησιμώτατον κατακοιμίζουσα.

<sup>6</sup> *Hell.* 4.8.39. Paul Cartledge suggests that the *paidika* in question was not necessarily a Spartan: Paul Cartledge, 'The Politics of Spartan Pederasty', *PCPhS* 207 (n.s. 27) (1981), p. 32 n. 32.

<sup>7</sup> Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.5.1, 2.1.1, 2.6.1, 4.5.9. For *enkrateia* in general, compare the significant place accorded to control over the bodily pleasures in Michel Foucault's account of 'the moral problematisation of pleasures': M. Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure*, Volume 2 of *The History of Sexuality*, translated from the French by Robert Hurley (Harmondsworth, 1986), Part 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Mem.* 2.1.21–34.  
<sup>9</sup> ἥτις οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναμένεις, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἐπιθυμῆσαι πάντων ἐμπίμπλασαι (Ibid. 2.1.30). For this phrase and the general interpretation of the passage, see Olof Gigon, *Kommentar zum zweiten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien* (Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, Heft 7, Basel, 1956).

Before the need arises you force the arousal of sexual desire, employing all kinds of tricks and using men as women; for this is the kind of training you give your friends, indulging in excesses at night and spending the most profitable part of the day in sleep.

The somewhat strange phrase, τὰ ἀφροδίσια . . . ἀναγκάζεις, is to be explained by the context where the emphasis is on the exploration of artificial (and so, it is suggested, demeaning) ways of gaining pleasure. As one may use fancy dishes to tempt a flagging appetite, so the sensualist must turn to more recondite forms of sex to achieve sexual arousal. If so, it is natural to interpret ἀνδράσιν (in the phrase 'using men as women') strictly in the sense of 'adult men'. The reference is not to the accepted customs of pederasty, but to coupling between grown men with anal penetration – a practice which, as Sir Kenneth Dover has shown, was generally regarded as degrading. It is, says the fable, a mark of depravity to resort to such practices as a means of stimulating sexual appetite when desire flags.<sup>10</sup>

For Xenophon the need for self-control and the perils of enslavement to bodily pleasure (above all, sex) are particularly important in those who exercise any kind of authority. Even when it comes to appointing a farm bailiff, he suggests, one should avoid a man who is excessively in love, because concern with his boy lover (*paidika*) may interfere with the punctilious performance of his duties.<sup>11</sup> Not surprisingly, then, the virtue of self-control is seen as essential for those who exercise military command. At *Memorabilia* 1.5.1, control over the bodily appetites is a prime consideration in choosing a military leader. In the world of affairs in which Xenophon had some experience, it is seen as an important element in the success of Iason of Pherai as a commander, a man described in the speech of Polydamas as 'the most self-controlled of all the men I know in regard to bodily pleasures (ἐγκρατέστατός γ' ἐστὶν ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡδονῶν).'<sup>12</sup> It is, above all for Xenophon, exemplified in the career of Agesilaos, to whom I shall return at the end of this article.

Enough has been said to sketch the place of self-control in Xenophon's concept of the good man, and in particular the good military commander. The exercise of this virtue (or the lack of it) in respect of *erōs* may be illustrated from three episodes in Xenophon's writings. As will be apparent to anyone acquainted with Xenophon's *Hellenica*, the order of presentation is determined by the logic of the argument, not the historical sequence.

The first episode is brief and, though not quite explicit, unproblematic. Little more is needed than to tell the story. It concerns an incident during Agesilaos' campaign against Thebes in 377 B.C. As a result of Spartan activities in Boiotia the Thebans had been unable to harvest their crops, and were suffering from a severe shortage of grain. They accordingly despatched two triremes up the coast to Pagasai to buy corn. The Spartans at the time had a garrison at Oreos on the island of Euboia under the command of one Alketas. He secretly manned three triremes and succeeded in capturing the Theban ships with their corn and 300 prisoners. Alketas kept his prisoners under guard on the acropolis at Oreos, where he had his own quarters. But not for long. As Xenophon relates,

In close attendance upon him [Alketas] there was, it was said, a boy from Oreos, who was a very fine young fellow. Alketas was in the habit of going down from the acropolis and devoting

<sup>10</sup> In §30 Virtue is on each point *heightening* the depravity which is only hinted at in Vice's opening statement in §24. Thus, taking pleasure in food and drink in §24 becomes, in §30, eating and drinking to excess, while sexual pleasure with boys is converted into treating men as women.

<sup>11</sup> Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 12.13–14.

<sup>12</sup> *Hell.* 6.1.16.

himself to this boy. But when the prisoners came to know of his laxity, they seized the acropolis and the city rebelled. As a result, the Thebans secured their corn with ease.<sup>13</sup>

Xenophon does not state in so many words that an erotic relationship was involved, but he often requires us to read between the lines, and there can hardly be any other explanation for Alketas deserting his post to seek out a local boy (παῖς) for no other reason than that he 'had an interest in him,' – *περὶ τοῦτον ἦν*. The use of *περὶ* with the accusative implies a preoccupation with something (less commonly, with people) in which or in whom one has a keen interest. G. E. Underhill suggests, 'was totally wrapped up in him.'<sup>14</sup> It is difficult to determine whether the description *μάλα καλὸς τε κάγαθός* (which I have translated 'a very fine young fellow') also points in this direction. The phrase commonly denotes moral worthiness and is used by Xenophon as a term of general approbation, applicable as well to a slave as to a general.<sup>15</sup> One wonders however whether its application to a youth who has no part to play except as an associate of Alketas, does not bring to the surface an underlying aesthetic reference, in a way which elsewhere requires further specification.<sup>16</sup> In this sense, Rex Warner translates, 'He was a fine attractive boy.' However that may be, Xenophon's narrative seems clearly to imply that the Spartan commander's neglect of his duties in pursuit of this boy had resulted in a significant military reverse.

My second example is as abstruse and debatable as the incident of Alketas was clear and self-explanatory. I refer to the episode of Thibron and the *aulos*-player Thersandros during Sparta's campaign against Strouthas in the Maiandros valley during 391 B.C. It is recounted in *Hellenica* 4.8.18–19. The general course of the brief campaign as it appears in Xenophon's narrative is clear enough. In an attempt to reassert Spartan influence in Asia Minor, Thibron was sent as commander of an expeditionary force to check the behaviour of Strouthas, general of the Great King, whose operations were favouring the Athenian interest. Strouthas, however, (so Xenophon informs us) had observed that Thibron's troops lacked discipline, and he soon succeeded in making a surprise attack which resulted in the deaths of Thibron and his companion Thersandros, and the flight of the Spartan army. For the military or indeed the political historian that account of the debacle may suffice. But the social historian is drawn to ask what Thibron and Thersandros may have been doing which apparently was responsible, at least in part, for precipitating the Spartan defeat. The passage is a longstanding *crux* whose obscurities have led many scholars to resort to emendation, and for which, so far as I am aware, no satisfactory solution has yet been proposed. I wish to argue that, unlikely as it may seem at first sight, the passage is to be understood as another example of the baneful effects of undisciplined *erōs*.

Before entering upon a more detailed discussion, we should recall what Xenophon has already reported about Thibron's earlier career and character. He first appears as the commander of the Spartan force in Asia Minor to which in 399 B.C. Xenophon transferred the veterans of the long march of the Ten Thousand.<sup>17</sup> The decision to join

<sup>13</sup> *Hell.* 5.4.56–7. The incident seems to have been part of a wider struggle for the control of Oreos (Histiaea), involving Jason of Pherai (Diod. XV 30. Cf. N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Greece* [3rd ed., Oxford, 1986], p. 490). The fact that Xenophon records only the incident of Alketas reflects his interest in the morality of generalship.

<sup>14</sup> *Xenophon: Hellenica*, Text by E. C. Marchant, Notes by G. E. Underhill (Oxford, 1906), p. 214. For *περὶ* with the accusative, Underhill compares Xenophon, *Hell.* 7.4.28. Cf. LSJ s.v.

<sup>15</sup> See K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford, 1974), pp. 41–5. The Xenophon references are *Oec.* 14.9 and *Hell.* 6.1.2.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Dover *ibid.* p. 41, who cites Aeschines 1.134 in this sense.

<sup>17</sup> *Anab.* 7.6.1, 7.7.57, 7.8.20–4.

Thibron was taken after tortuous negotiations between envoys from the Spartan and the court of Seuthes, ruler of Thrace, with whom the Greek mercenaries had taken service. The fact that for much of the time these negotiations seem to have taken place behind Xenophon's back, and that at one point it was put around that Xenophon's life was in danger if he joined Thibron,<sup>18</sup> suggest that from the beginning there was some cause for ill-feeling between Xenophon and the Spartan commander. No more is heard of the death threat, however, and it may have been a fabrication designed to put pressure on Xenophon. However that may be, he in the end personally conducted his force to meet Thibron at Pergamos, and (it seems generally agreed) joined the latter's campaign against the Persian Tissaphernes as commander of the veterans of the long march. As Delebecque has pointed out, Xenophon firmly disliked Thibron, perhaps because he was forced to accept a position subordinate to a man who had far less experience of warfare in Asia than he did himself.<sup>19</sup> Certainly, the brief reports of Thibron's period of command contained in the *Hellenica* are distinctly denigratory.<sup>20</sup> He was, according to Xenophon, laggardly in bringing Tissaphernes to battle; while he gained control of several cities by voluntary submission, those he took by storm were 'weak'; and where resistance was offered (at Larisa) he failed. Because he seemed to be accomplishing nothing, the ephors then ordered him to leave Larisa and campaign against Karia, where he was replaced by Derkyildas. He was then recalled to Sparta, fined and exiled. In addition to this tally of military incompetence, it was said that he allowed his soldiers to plunder their allies – an oppression which his successor sought to avoid. Here as elsewhere the inadequacy (to put it no higher) of Thibron is used by Xenophon to show up the high qualities of his successors.<sup>21</sup>

While Thibron was subsequently appointed to command the campaign against Strouthas which is my immediate concern, it would seem from the background I have sketched, that Xenophon regarded him as a man about whom a highly discreditable story could properly be told, of a kind that he might have suppressed in the case of any other Spartan. That such was the case appears (I believe) from the text which I now wish to examine in some detail – *Hellenica* 4.8.18. As found in the Oxford Classical Text, it runs as follows:

προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου κατανοήσας ὁ Στρούθας ὅτι Θίβρων βοηθοίη ἐκάστοτε ἀτάκτως καὶ καταφρονητικῶς, ἐπέμψεν ἰππέας εἰς τὸ πεδίον καὶ καταδραμόντας ἐκέλευσε περιβαλλομένους ἐλαύνειν ὃ τι δύναιντο. ὁ δὲ Θίβρων ἐτύγχανεν ἐξ ἀρίστου διασκηνῶν μετὰ Θερσάνδρου τοῦ αὐλητοῦ. ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θέρσανδρος οὐ μόνον αὐλητῆς ἀγαθός, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλκῆς [ισχύος], ἅτε λακωνίζων, ἀντεποιεῖτο.

The critical sentences are the last two, and it may be helpful to state at the outset the conclusion for which I propose to argue. My central contention is that *λακωνίζων* here should be recognised as an example (unique, it appears, in prose of the Classical era) of the meaning attributed to it by later lexicographers – to engage in pederasty – probably with the added nuance for which Dover has argued, of referring to anal penetration.<sup>22</sup> I would then propose to translate the passage as follows:

As time went on, Strouthas noticed that Thibron's sorties were on each occasion conducted in an indisciplined and over-confident manner. So he despatched cavalry to the plain with orders to ride down upon the enemy, to surround them and carry off whatever they could. Now, it so

<sup>18</sup> *Anab.* 7.6.43.

<sup>19</sup> Édouard Delebecque, *Essai sur la Vie de Xénophon* (Paris, 1957), p. 134. Cf. H. D. Westlake, 'Individuals in Xenophon's *Hellenica*', in *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* (Manchester, 1969), pp. 210f.

<sup>20</sup> *Hell.* 3.1.4–8, 3.2.1.

<sup>21</sup> Delebecque, *op. cit.* p. 134. Cf. Vivienne Gray, *op. cit.* p. 35.

<sup>22</sup> K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*, pp. 187–8.

happened that Thibron was retiring in his tent after the morning meal with Thersandros, the *aulētēs*. For Thersandros was not only a good *aulos*-player, but also made some claim to prowess as the active partner in anal sex.

It was (Xenophon implies) because the commander was occupied in this activity while within range of the enemy that his troops lacked direction and were exposed to surprise attack.

Can such an interpretation be made good?

Two amendments have been proposed for this passage, neither of which appears to rest on any evidence of irregularity in the manuscripts. The first (the excision of *ισχύος*) is of little moment. The word is so obviously a marginal gloss on the somewhat rarer and more poetical *ἀλκῆς* that there need be no hesitation in deleting it. Rieckher's proposal to replace *διασκηνῶν* with *δισκεύων* (accepted in the Teubner text and in Rex Warner's recent translation) is more debatable and takes us to the heart of the problem. Certainly it is very difficult to assign a meaning to *διασκηνῶν* in this context if *λακωνίζων* means, as is generally supposed, 'adopting Spartan ways.' The connective *γάρ* must indicate that the sentence it introduces explains why Thibron was engaging in whatever activity is signified by *διασκηνῶν*. It might, just possibly, be explained as a defence to the charge that it was undignified for a Spartan commander to associate with a mere *aulētēs*, particularly one who was not even a Spartan. This seems unlikely on the part of a writer who has so far said nothing good about Thibron. Nor does this faltering explanation deal with the wider problem, that the whole incident concerning Thersandros seems intended to explain why Thibron was so easily surprised by the enemy.

In favour of the amendment, *δισκεύων*, it can be said that it makes a tolerable connexion with Thersandros' claim to physical prowess – though *ἀλκή* and *ἄλκιμος* elsewhere in Xenophon seem to relate more to prowess in deeds of courage than mere physical strength.<sup>23</sup> It is also true that according to Xenophon Spartan troops were required to exercise regularly while on campaign, though discus is not among the athletic exercises mentioned.<sup>24</sup> But it is doubtful whether the amendment satisfactorily explains why Thibron was so easily surprised by the enemy attack. If engaged in discus throwing or any other open-air activity, he might reasonably be expected to have seen the enemy cavalry approaching. If his real fault was a failure to appoint sentries (though Xenophon does not mention this), then the charming vignette of the game of quoits is not only irrelevant but misleading.

None of these considerations comes into play if the reading of the manuscripts can be satisfactorily explained as it stands. Let us then return to the text, and consider whether by adjusting the interpretation of other parts of the context it is possible to avoid emending *διασκηνῶν*. The key, I suggest, is *λακωνίζων*. One certainly cannot prove beyond doubt that Xenophon had in mind the meaning *παιδικοῖς χρῆσθαι*, or something like it. But a number of considerations may at least make us hesitate before ruling it out altogether.

There are of course a number of instances in Xenophon in which *λακωνίζειν* refers

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Xenophon, *Hell.* 6.1.12, *Agésilas* 10.1, *Cyrop.* 7.5.75, *Hiero* 5.1, 9.6, *Oecon.* 4.15, 6.10. One must however be cautious in generalising about 4th century usage when Aristotle (*Pol.* 1338a 20) makes *ὕγιειαν καὶ ἀλκὴν* the aim of physical exercise.

<sup>24</sup> Xenophon, *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 12.5. This text however requires the exercise to be taken before, not after, the morning meal. Advocates of the amendment *δισκεύων* may also appeal to the fact that an *aulētēs* was sometimes employed to help athletes maintain their rhythm in sports such as discus. Cf. Max Wegner, *Das Musikleben der Griechen* (Berlin, 1949), pp. 100–3.

unambiguously to taking the Spartan side in a political sense.<sup>25</sup> In this it is paralleled by similar verbal forms relating to other states – ἀττικίζειν, βοιωτιάζειν, ἀργολίζειν.<sup>26</sup> Nearly always the grammatical subject is a group of people, a faction within a city, or collectively the city as a whole. I have found only one case in Xenophon where a verb of this type is used of an individual changing his political allegiance.<sup>27</sup> Otherwise, the few examples relating to an individual (apart from the passage under review) seem to refer to speaking the language concerned, or speaking with a certain accent.<sup>28</sup> None of these examples bears upon the present context, where 'laconising' has to explain a claim to prowess.

In other examples of the word λακωνίζειν quoted by Liddell and Scott, the context makes its significance clear. In Plato's *Protagoras* (342b) there is an extended joke at the Spartan expense, suggesting that their boorish customs and addiction to athletic exercise are a façade designed to conceal their true excellence which consists in the practice of philosophy. The purpose, says Plato, is to appear to excel in the military virtues, an aim taken up by those who imitate them (οἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι λακωνίζοντες) in manner of life (with thonged boxing gloves, style of cloak and so on). Similar references to fashions of dress, coupled with glowering looks, mark out the laconisers in Demosthenes 54.34, to which Plutarch (*Alcibiades* 23) adds unkempt hair, addiction to cold baths, barley bread and black sauce. Elsewhere in Plutarch we find laconism in pronunciation and studied brevity of speech.<sup>29</sup>

All these passages give specific descriptions of the sort of behaviour which justifies the use of the term 'laconising'. *Hellenica* 4.8.18 is unique among the passages so far cited for the non-political sense in not providing any such description. True, the account in the *Protagoras*, with its reference to a pretence of military virtue, is fairly readily applied to Thersandros' claim to prowess in our passage. But neither this nor any of the elucidations of λακωνίζειν found in the other quoted authorities will provide the explanation of διασκηγῶν which the unamended text of *Hellenica* 4.8.18 requires. There remains however one other meaning for λακωνίζειν where such evidence as is available suggests that the word might be used without further specification – in its reference to pederasty.

The evidence, as presented by Sir Kenneth Dover, is complex. Discussion starts from Hesychius' statement that λακωνίζειν means 'to use *paidika*', supplemented by the Suda, which adds that this meaning is found in a lost play of Aristophanes, referred to as 'Thesmophoriazousai 2'.<sup>30</sup> This appears to be the only unchallenged occurrence of this meaning in the classical period. In addition, Meineke suggested, somewhat tentatively, that a fragment of Eupolis preserved in Athenaeus might bear the same meaning.<sup>31</sup> Though this Eupolis fragment is not mentioned by Dover, it is perhaps worth reviewing. It runs:

Αλκιβ: μισῶ λακωνίζειν, ταγηνίζειν δὲ κἄν πριαίμην  
 Β: πολλὰς δ'...οἶμαι νῦν βεβηγήσθαι...  
 Α: ...ὃς δὲ πρῶτος ἐξέυρεν τὸ πρῶ 'πιπίνειν;  
 Β: πολλὴν γε λακκοπρωκτίαν ἡμῖν ἐπίστασ' εὐρών.  
 Α: εἶεν. τίς εἶπεν 'ἀμίδα παῖ' πρῶτος μεταξὺ πίνων;  
 Β: Παλαμηδικόν γε τοῦτο τοῦξεύρημα καὶ σοφόν σου.

<sup>25</sup> *Hell.* 4.4.2, 4.8.28, 5.4.55, 6.3.14, 6.4.18, 7.1.44, 7.4.34.

<sup>26</sup> *Hell.* 1.6.13, 6.3.14, 4.8.34, 5.2.6, 5.4.34.

<sup>27</sup> *Μηδίσας*, used of Gongylos at *Hell.* 3.1.6.

<sup>28</sup> *Anab.* 3.1.26, 4.5.34, 7.3.25.

<sup>29</sup> Plutarch, *Moralia* 150b, 513a.

<sup>30</sup> K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*, p. 187.

<sup>31</sup> A. Meineke, *Fragmenta Poetarum Comoediae Antiquae* (Berlin 1839), Pars Prima, pp. 547–8. The excerpt is from Athenaeus 1.17d. The text is cited from T. Kock, *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1880–8), Eupolis, fragment 351.



The passage is quoted by Athenaeus to illustrate the usage of *ἀμῖς* (chamber-pot), and the absence of the immediately preceding lines (as well as the possibility of lacunae) makes it impossible to be sure of the interpretation of *λακωνίζειν*. The fondness of the comic poets for making jokes about copulatory and excretory functions, and the presence of such references later in the passage (*βεβινῆσθαι*, *λακκοπωκτία*, *ἀμῖς*) suggest a reference to pederasty. Kock however rejects this meaning on the grounds that it does not fit with the customary reference of the verb *ταγηνίζειν* ('to fry') to luxurious banqueting. *Λακωνίζειν* may therefore, according to Kock, mean to eat simple food (in Spartan fashion), in contrast to the rich food implied by *ταγηνίζειν*.<sup>32</sup> Kock admits that on this view it is impossible to understand the connexion between the first two lines.

While Meineke's proposal cannot be decisively affirmed, the objection to it advanced by Kock can I think be removed. In a society where slaves were regarded as readily available to their masters and could, it seems, be presented as gifts to an important personage,<sup>33</sup> the following hypothetical context for the disputed lines seems quite possible. Suppose that the conversation is about the purchase of a (male) slave cook (and *πρίαμαι* seems often to be used for the purchase of slaves), B could have suggested that A's purpose is to secure a handsome sexual partner. A replies that he has no taste for anal intercourse with his own sex, even though he might buy the man for his cooking. Not to be cheated of his sexual jibe, B. rejoins, 'That's all very well, but plenty of *women*, I think, have been entered [by you].' It seems therefore quite possible that we have here a second example from the classical era of a sexual meaning for *λακωνίζειν*.

Whether or not this passage of Eupolis be taken to have a sexual reference, Sir Kenneth Dover calls upon the term *κυσολάκων* and a number of references to the use of women to argue that *λακωνίζειν* may well have meant originally 'to have anal intercourse, irrespective of the sex of the person penetrated.' This more specific meaning might well explain the rarity of the usage. Once however the possibility of a sexual reference in the Xenophon passage is admitted, the reference to anal intercourse would make the word peculiarly applicable to the relationship between Thibron and Thersandros. Whatever they did together, their relationship can hardly have been that between *erastēs* and *erōmenos*, for the age of the participants would rule that out. Thibron, certainly, was a mature man. He had been experienced enough to be appointed Spartan harmost in Asia Minor first in 400 B.C., and the text under discussion refers to a period some nine years later, when he had been appointed to a second command. Less certainty attaches to Thersandros, but he is generally regarded as identical with the *aulētēs* of that name referred to in Polyaeus 6.10. Polyaeus records that a certain Alexandros had been phrourarch of the lands

<sup>32</sup> T. Kock, op. cit. I, p. 351.

<sup>33</sup> It is doubtful whether a slave could claim the protection of the law against anything done by his owner. According to Demosthenes XXI 47, the law on *hybris* prohibited violence against a slave, but this probably operated only as a ban on assaulting someone else's slave (which was in effect an offence against that slave's owner). See David M. Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality* (New York and London, 1990), p. 185 n. 70. My argument requires no more than a recognition that the master-slave relationship must have afforded easy opportunities for seduction. On the availability of slaves to their masters in the ancient world generally, see Peter Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (London and Boston, 1988), p. 23. The giving of slaves as gifts is observed by Xenophon in *Anab.* 7.3.27 and *Cyrop.* 5.5.38-9. The gifts offered to Kyaxares on the latter occasion included a handsome winewaiter and a good cook. Neither instance relates to Athenian society, but Xenophon's account shows no sign of surprise or criticism.

around Aiolis, where he devised an ingenious scheme for raising money. He organized a theatrical spectacle in order to inveigle the inhabitants of neighbouring towns into the theatre, where he held them, surrounded with soldiers, with a view to extracting ransom money for their release. Having done this, he handed over his territories to Thibron and departed. Among the artists whose reputation attracted the populace to the event was the *aulētēs* Thersandros. The location, Aiolis, attaches this narrative to Thibron's first campaign in Asia, which, according to Xenophon, involved a number of Aiolian cities, as well as Pergamos of Mysia, on the borders of Aiolis.<sup>34</sup> Thus, if Polyaeus is to be believed, even before Thibron's first appearance in Asia in 400, Thersandros had achieved sufficient reputation as an *aulētēs* to attract quite a following. He could hardly have been less than a mature adult when in 391 he was travelling in Thibron's company on the plain of the Maiandros.

If then the word *λακωνίζων* here carries a sexual connotation, it probably refers to anal intercourse between two adult men. One must then ask whether such an interpretation can accommodate the words, *ἀλκῆς ἀντεποιεῖτο*. The middle use, *ἀντιποιέομαι*, though not common, has broadly speaking two meanings in Xenophon. It may denote contending with someone else for the possession of something, such as rule over cities or empire.<sup>35</sup> Elsewhere however, it means to lay claim to something or, perhaps, strive to possess it. In the latter category mention is made of rule, money and the craft of cookery,<sup>36</sup> and the last named provides a close parallel to the sense required in our passage. *Ἀλκή* is a human ability or quality which Thersandros 'professes' or 'lays claim to', but the basis of his claim to prowess is expressed in *ἀτε λακωνίζων* – inasmuch as he plays the active role in anal intercourse.

Granted the sexual reference in the passage, it is natural to read the description of Thersandros' claim as ironical: his prowess is with the phallus, not the sword. That such a turn of phrase might come readily to Xenophon is suggested by the positive response to ironic wit which he shows elsewhere. One recalls the oft-quoted *bōn mot* of Theramenes, as he tossed away the dregs of the hemlock – *Κριτὶς τοῦτ' ἔστω τῷ καλῷ* – where Xenophon adds an aside to indicate his appreciation of the witticism. While the saying is attributed to Theramenes, the placing and significance accorded to it, as Vivienne Gray has argued, reveals the shaping hand of the historian.<sup>37</sup> For a further example of irony, one may recall Pharnabazos' speech at his parley with Agesilaos, where one may feel with some confidence that the formulation is due to Xenophon himself. It includes the satrap's ironic reproach to Agesilaos for the injustice he has suffered, with the words, 'If I do not know either what is holy or what is just, will you please demonstrate to me in what way such deeds are appropriate to men who understand how to return favours.'<sup>38</sup> One may also refer to the extended use of irony in the successive speeches in Xenophon's *Symposium*, in which (from Socrates' claim to be a procurer to Antisthenes' claim to wealth) the true meaning of

<sup>34</sup> *Hell.* 3.1.4–7. Of the cities named by Xenophon, Larisa, Myrina and Gryneia are included in Herodotus' list of Aiolian cities (1.149). Xenophon alone calls Larisa 'Egyptian', but it is probably to be identified with the town of that name mentioned by Herodotus, owing its sobriquet to the presence of Egyptian settlers. See J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (California, 1970), pp. 167–8 and p. 314 n. 12–13.

<sup>35</sup> *Anab.* 2.1.11, 2.3.23, *Hell.* 4.8.14.

<sup>36</sup> *Mem.* 2.1.1, *Lac. Pol.* 1.9, *Mem.* 3.5.8, 3.14.6. The latter reads: *καίτοι πῶς οὐ γελοῖον ἐστὶ παρασκευάζεσθαι μὲν ὀψοποιούς τοὺς ἀριστα ἐπισταμένους, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴδ' ἀντιποιούμενον τῆς τέχνης ταύτης τὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ποιούμενα μετατιθέναι;*

<sup>37</sup> *Hell.* 2.3.56. V. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, pp. 26–8.

<sup>38</sup> *Hell.* 4.1.33. Another ironic turn of phrase is found when Agesilaos, after having devastated parts of Korinthia, suggests that the Boiotian ambassadors may wish to see 'the good fortune of their friends', knowing full well that what they will actually see is disaster (*Hell.* 4.5.9).

each speaker is at variance with the superficial signification of the virtue he claims. The schematism here surely suggests the art of Xenophon the author, rather than an exact recollection of what was said on a particular occasion.<sup>39</sup>

The irony in the description of Thersandros' claim to prowess is in keeping with the rest of the passage which is otherwise controlled by a degree of innuendo and euphemism. It also accords with the fact that elsewhere in Xenophon ἀλκή does not simply mean physical strength, but is associated with courageous deeds. In the field headquarters of a campaign supposedly dedicated to military valour, Thersandros is distinguished by valour of a different kind, and in thus characterising the company he keeps, Xenophon directs what for him is another insult at the despised Thibron, who is by implication the passive object of Thersandros' 'prowess'.<sup>40</sup>

I go on to ask how the conclusion to which the arguments so far advanced seem to point illuminates, or may perhaps be supported by, the disputed διασκηνών. Clearly the statement that not only was Thersandros a good *aulētēs* but he professed prowess as a 'laconiser', is intended to explain the fact that after the morning meal Thibron happened to be 'διασκηνών' in his company. While the primary meaning of σκηνή is 'tent', in Xenophon's narratives the word and its derivatives are not limited to accommodation in tents, but can mean any kind of billets or quarters – in ships, for example, or houses.<sup>41</sup> Σκηνή and its verbal derivatives can also mean 'banquet',<sup>42</sup> and it is relevant to note that in both the passages quoted for this meaning from the *Cyropaedia*, 'bringing the feast to an end' or 'breaking up the party' is signalled by a compound with δια:

διαλύσαντες τὴν σκηνὴν ἀνεπαύοντο.  
τὴν σκηνὴν εἰς κοίτην διέλυον.

Both noun and verb are also used of ordinary meals – the common messes of the Spartans, where the Spartan συσκήνια are contrasted with Greek habits elsewhere, where they eat at home (οἴκοι σκηνοῦντας).<sup>43</sup>

The compounds of the verbal form (other than with δια-) are used logically and consistently in Xenophon. The commonest is συσκηνέω – share a tent or a mess, with its offshoot σύσκηρος – messmate. Συσκηνέω may also, occasionally, mean 'banquet

<sup>39</sup> Not only does Socrates boast of being a 'procurer' (*Symp.* 3.10), but the claims of other speakers turn out to be similarly ironical: Kallias claims 'to make men better' – by giving them money; Kritoboulos boasts his good looks – largely because of the power they give him over others; Charmides admires 'poverty' – as a means of avoiding the impost of *leitourgia*; Antisthenes claims 'wealth' – in the fewness of his needs and the richness of his soul.

For the ironic suggestion that the strength appropriate to a soldier may be exhibited in sexual dominance, a comic parallel is provided by Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 591–2, where Dikaiopolis jeers at the (fully-armed) general, Lamachos. Dover, 204, translates the line: 'If you're such a mighty man, come on, bare my knob' (εἰ δ' ἰσχυρὸς εἶ, τί μ' οὐκ ἀπεψώλησας;). The comparison with Xenophon is particularly apt if, as Professor Dover suggests, Dikaiopolis's words imply that the active partner penetrates the other anally while stimulating his penis. Both Dikaiopolis and Lamachos are, of course, grown men.

<sup>40</sup> For ἀλκή in Xenophon, cf. note 23 above.

For the shame of the passive role, cf. K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*, pp. 103–5. D. M. Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality* (pp. 30–1), emphasises the asymmetry of penetrative relationships, and the subordinate status of the one penetrated. Cf. also, Eva Cantarella, *Bisexuality in the Ancient World* (transl. by Cormac Ó Cuilleaináin, New Haven and London 1992), pp. 44–8.

That the criticism of Thibron remains somewhat indirect is probably due to Xenophon's pro-Spartan bias. Despite his personal dislike of Thibron he is reluctant too openly to criticise a Spartan commander. He felt no such inhibition about the Thessalian, Menon (*Anab.* 2.6.21–8).

<sup>41</sup> *Hell.* 5.1.20, *Cyrop.* 8.3.34.

<sup>42</sup> *Anab.* 4.5.33, *Cyrop.* 2.3.1, 3.2.31.

<sup>43</sup> *Lac. Pol.* 5.2, 15.4.

together', with σύσκηνοι as 'fellow-banqueters'.<sup>44</sup> παρασκηνάω is to camp alongside, and ἀποσκηνέω, to encamp at a distance from.<sup>45</sup> κατασκηνάω or κατασκηνόω are commoner, but show a less clear-cut meaning. They seem however, rather like the English 'camp down' to shift the emphasis to pitching tent or taking up quarters,<sup>46</sup> rather than dwelling in or being encamped at a certain place.

As for διασκηνέω, apart from *Hell.* 4.8.18, there are six occurrences of the verb (whether in -έω or -όω) to be found in Xenophon. Four of them occur in the *Anabasis*, within a few paragraphs of each other, in the course of a description of conditions during one of the most testing times of the great march. The army is struggling to progress through snow in the mountains of what we now know as Kurdistan. The mood of the local inhabitants is uncertain, and the likelihood of surprise attack hard to gauge. The question, debated on more than one occasion, is whether to disperse the troops to spend the night in various neighbouring villages, where they will have protection against the bitter weather, or to sleep together in one spot, despite the extreme cold, so as to be ready to meet a surprise attack. The word for the dispersal strategy is διασκηνεῖν (or, once, διασκηνοῦν), where διὰ is manifestly used in its distributive sense, 'in different directions'.<sup>47</sup> It is not clear whether any difference in meaning is intended between the form in -έω and that in -όω.<sup>48</sup> In *Anab.* 4.4.10, the meaning of διασκηνοῦν is clarified by its contrast with the alternative strategy - συναγαγεῖν τὸ στράτευμα. The words seem to be used throughout intransitively, - 'to take up one's quarters separately, or in a dispersed fashion.' Possibly the present infinitive at 4.4.10 means 'to spend time in dispersed quarters' - the situation otherwise expressed by διασκηνήσαντες οὕτως ἐκοιμήθησαν (4.5.29), which divides the sequence into the act of dispersal to quarters and the period of sleeping.

The other two occurrences are in quite different contexts, and refer to guests or simply participants, dispersing after a meal. The first of these refers to the conclusion of communal meals among the Spartans. The second (from the *Cyropaedia*), is found at the end of a long description of Cyrus' dealings with the King of Armenia and his son Tigranes.<sup>49</sup> The Armenian had reneged on his obligation to pay tribute, and was being held captive by Cyrus. The latter however is dissuaded from putting the Armenian to death by a long philosophical discourse from the king's son, Tigranes. Tigranes had been Cyrus' companion in his youth, and such is his eloquence that the Persian King is persuaded to commute a substantial portion of the Armenian's debt, and make a most generous settlement. He there and then invites the Armenian king and his family to a meal. The story continues, Διασκηνοῦντων δὲ μετὰ δείπνον, ἐπῆρετο ὁ Κύρος..., and his question to Tigranes launches another philosophical discussion.

The use of διασκηνεῖν in these two passages has been variously interpreted. The Loeb translator, assuming that the meaning of σκηνή as banquet predominates, makes both passages refer to the 'break-up' of the dinner party, without any reference to 'tents'. A second type of interpretation however is to be found in Liddell and Scott, which gives for the first passage, 'separate and retire each into his billet (σκηναί)', 'go into billets', and for the second, 'leave another's tent.'

<sup>44</sup> *Cyrop.* 2.2.29, 3.2.25.

<sup>45</sup> *Anab.* 3.1.28, 3.4.35.

<sup>46</sup> *Anab.* 3.4.32-3, 7.4.11, *Hell.* 4.2.23, 4.5.2, *Cyrop.* 4.5.39, 6.2.2.

<sup>47</sup> *Anab.* 4.4.8, 4.4.10, 4.4.14, 4.5.29.

<sup>48</sup> For the simple verb, Liddell and Scott gives σκηνέω (σκηνάω) = 'dwell in a camp', and σκηνόω = 'pitch camp.' But the distinction is not clearcut, and σκηνόω can take on either meaning (see LSJ s.v.).

<sup>49</sup> *Lac. Pol.* 5.3, *Cyrop.* 3.1.38.

The first view derives, presumably, from Stephanus, who says that Xenophon uses *διασκηνεῖν* here (and, incidentally, in *Hell.* 4.8.18) to signify what he elsewhere refers to as *διαλύειν τὴν σκηνήν*.<sup>50</sup> But despite this authority, *διασκηνεῖν*, by analogy with the other compounds of *σκηνέω* should surely mean 'camp separately' (as in the *Anabasis* passages) or, if the *σκηνή* element is taken to refer to a banquet, the compound should mean 'dine separately' (a translation which would make nonsense of both passages). Besides this etymological point, it can be said in favour of the second type of interpretation that it is natural in the *Lac. Pol.* passage to assume that the diners at the end of the communal meal return to their homes or billets, thus reversing the procedure which brings them out of their homes to join the communal meal in the first place.

The interpretation 'dispersing to quarters' is more difficult to bring to bear on the description of Cyrus' entertainment of the Armenian king. I have described this a little more fully to bring out the point that it is not just a matter of Cyrus entertaining in his tent (which he was accustomed to do)<sup>51</sup> officers or others from his own camp, who would have tents of their own to retire to. This was not true of the Armenian king and his entourage. For (lacking in verisimilitude as it may be), Xenophon represents the sequence of events from surrender, through captivity to trial (and discussion with Tigranes) as all occurring within the space of one day, and Cyrus' hospitality clearly did not extend to offering his vassals a bed for the night. On the other hand, Cyrus does conclude his offer of dinner (to a family who were still technically his captives) with the remark that having dined they would be free to go wherever they wished.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, grammatically *διασκηνοῦντων* refers to something which occurs *after* the meal. It may naturally be taken to refer to the Armenian and his family preparing to depart for their chosen destination – their own homes, or elsewhere. This view would preserve us from the necessity of entering into rather different territory for the meaning of *διδά* here: 'withdrawing from someone else's tent,' as Liddell and Scott translates.

My conclusion is that in all its uses elsewhere in Xenophon *διασκηνεῖν* can, and probably should, be taken to mean either dispersing to separate tents/quarters, or spending time in separate tents/quarters. It may therefore be expected to carry the same meaning at *Hell.* 4.8.18. A certain flexibility however may be allowed in view of the unique characteristics of this passage. Assuming that Spartans on campaign (as at home) followed the custom of eating together, the passage is aligned with *Lac. Pol.* 5.3 in that the dispersal to quarters takes place after a meal – though the meal in question is *ariston* not *deipnon*. Nowhere else, however, is the subject of the verb an individual person, nor in other passages is companionship between individuals alluded to. Occasionally the simple verb *σκηνοῦν* takes a singular subject to denote the place where an individual commander has his quarters (as with Agesilaos and Alketas).<sup>53</sup> But in *Hell.* 4.8.18 it is not just a question of locating the commander's quarters, or retiring to one's billet for the night, but of something passing between Thibron and Thersandros which needs to be explained by Thersandros' claim to prowess. These considerations taken together would, I think, suggest the translation: 'Thibron happened to be spending time apart in his tent with Thersandros after the morning meal.'

Turning from this grammatical and lexical analysis, we should ask briefly what can be learned from a study of the relevant social and military background. From

<sup>50</sup> *Cyrop.* 2.3.1, 3.2.31. Cf. above, p. 356.

<sup>51</sup> *Cyrop.* 2.1.30.

<sup>52</sup> *Cyrop.* 3.1.37.

<sup>53</sup> *Hell.* 4.6.7, 5.4.56.

Xenophon's account in *Hell.* 4.8.17–19 the general picture of the campaign is fairly clear, with Thibron's army based on the cities of the Maiandros plain, sending out raids into the surrounding countryside. Encampments were presumably of the rough and ready kind described by J. K. Anderson – unfortified, frequently moved, bivouacs rather than entrenched positions, in which the *σκηναί* would consist of rough shelters of timber and brushwood, rather than tents proper.<sup>54</sup> At first Thibron had some success, until Strouthas observed the indisciplined nature of his operations and began making harrying attacks on the Spartans. The sequence of events in the final and decisive episode in these operations is, however, less clear. Xenophon's brief narrative begins somewhat abruptly *in mediis rebus* with Thibron and Thersandros in their 'tent.' The clue to the situation is, it seems, reserved until the concluding lines of paragraph 19: it was an example of Thibron's habit of setting out on a foray against the enemy without giving proper orders to his troops. It would seem that he had gone out on this raid with only a portion of his army, and was presumably occupying a temporary bivouac, while the rest of the Spartan force, being uninformed of the raid, was left behind at the main encampment.<sup>55</sup> Ill-disciplined and heedless of danger in his preoccupation with Thersandros, Thibron was exposed to attack by Strouthas' sizeable body of well-ordered cavalry.

The crucial moment occurred 'after the morning meal.' There are frequent references to meals in Xenophon's narratives, and the common pattern is for the evening meal to be followed by sleep, while following the morning meal preparations are made for marching, preparing for or engaging in battle.<sup>56</sup> There are of course exceptions, particularly when in the interests of tactical surprise, forced marches or attacks are undertaken at night. But I have found no example of a general retiring to his tent during the day for any purpose other than to take counsel of a military or judicial kind.<sup>57</sup> It is no doubt the difficulty of understanding the purpose for which Thibron and Thersandros might have retired to their 'tent' that has prompted scholars to eliminate *διασκηνῶν* by emendation. But the stronger the arguments for declaring such a withdrawal from company to be unprecedented, and inexplicable under the normal routines on campaign, the more powerful the support for the view

<sup>54</sup> Cf. J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon*, pp. 60–6.

<sup>55</sup> A significant number of Spartans were saved from destruction, *διὰ τὸ ὀφείλει αἰσθῆσθαι τῆς βοηθείας* (*Hell.* 4.8.19).

<sup>56</sup> The sequence is illustrated in the manoeuvres before Aigospotamoi (*Hell.* 2.1.20–2), where both sides follow the pattern: *ariston*, action, *deipnon*, the night passes, *ariston*, further action. Cf. *Cyrop.* 6.3.37–6.4.1. For *ariston* followed by action, see *Hell.* 4.5.3, 5.4.38, 6.5.20, *Anab.* 3.3.6, 4.6.8–9, 5.4.22, 6.3.24. Xenophon is not afraid to point out the truism that a meal fortifies one to fight (*Anab.* 6.5.21), and it is exceptional for a body of soldiers to go forward 'ἀνάρπιστοι' (*Hell.* 4.5.8). On the other hand, rest and sleep follow *deipnon*: *Hell.* 4.3.20, 4.6.7, 7.2.23, *Anab.* 6.3.20–1, 6.4.10. Other examples could be given, but while the rule of sleep following *deipnon* is often broken in order to achieve tactical surprise, I have not found any place (except the present passage) where soldiers take it easy after *ariston*. Curiously, rest and relaxation during the afternoon is, according to Xenophon, prescribed by Lykourgos (*Lac. Pol.* 12.6), though a military historian could hardly be expected to record so unredeemably banal a piece of routine. But if this account does reflect the practice of a Spartan army at base camp, one may doubt whether it would have applied to a skirmishing or expeditionary force in an advanced position close to encounter with the enemy.

<sup>57</sup> The use of tents for purposes other than sleeping (or, in the case of senior commanders, feasting) is rarely reported. For the most part, Xenophon's reports (apart from notes of individuals going to their tents) fall into two groups: as we should expect, commanders at all levels hold council in their tents (*Hell.* 1.1.30, *Anab.* 1.6.4, 3.5.7, *Cyrop.* 2.2.21; or the tent is the place for a banquet (*Cyrop.* 2.1.30, 2.3.19). At *Cyrop.* 5.3.46, army commanders depart to their tents after receiving orders. There is nothing in all of this to prepare us for the holding of a tête à tête between a Spartan commander and an Ionian *aulētēs*.

here proposed: Thibron was flouting the norms of expected behaviour and that was the cause of his undoing.

Xenophon does not describe in detail exactly what went on, but follows the rule of polite society, that in sexual matters language should be imprecise and reticence observed.<sup>58</sup> The word *λακωνίζειν* itself may be regarded as a euphemism, and without explicitly stating that the two men indulged themselves sexually, Xenophon leaves his readers to draw this inference from the fact that they went apart (a degree of privacy was required for sex<sup>59</sup>) and that Thersandros had a reputation for 'laconising'.<sup>60</sup>

My conclusion, then, is that the incident of Thibron and Thersandros provides another example of a military commander's failure to control his erotic desire bringing disaster upon his troops. Not only did Thibron fail to give proper orders, but, instead of taking due precautions while within range of the enemy cavalry, he spent the prime time for action (after the morning meal) disporting himself in his tent with his companion. Thus engaged, when the enemy struck, he was in no position either to direct his troops or defend himself, and in consequence he and Thersandros were the first to be killed, while the army was routed, with many casualties.

This view of the incident has it seems to me all the arguments of coherence in its favour. Once the possibility of a sexual meaning for *λακωνίζων* is accepted, it readily accounts for all the linguistic elements in the passage, and provides a smooth and intelligible connexion of thought without the need for emending the text. It offers a clear explanation of why Thibron's activity made him so vulnerable to surprise attack, and the plausibility of such an explanation is enhanced by the episode of Alketas discussed earlier. Finally, the proposed interpretation is consistent with all that is said elsewhere about Thibron's laxity and incompetence, a point strikingly developed by one passage yet to be examined.

A few paragraphs after recording the death of Thibron, Xenophon comes to describe his successor in the Spartan command. This man, a certain Diphridas, was, says Xenophon, no less charming (*εὔχαρις*) than Thibron, but a better organised and more enterprising general, for he was not at the mercy of his bodily pleasures (*οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναί*).<sup>61</sup> The implied contrast is obvious, yet, apart from the passage which I have analysed at such length, there is nothing in Xenophon's previous narrative to suggest that Thibron's shortcomings included an inability to control his bodily appetites. In mentioning this characteristic, Xenophon is surely high-lighting the prime cause of Thibron's downfall in the incident he has just described.

More generally, this judgment on Thibron's lack of *enkrateia* reflects Xenophon's wider interest in the morality of self-control noted at the beginning of this article. Indeed, the incident of Thibron and Thersandros shows an interesting affinity with

<sup>58</sup> So K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*, pp. 53–4.

<sup>59</sup> So D. M. Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality*, pp. 91 and 182, n. 28.

<sup>60</sup> Quite apart from what is given in Xenophon's text, one is tempted to speculate on what an Ionian *aulētēs* was doing in the camp anyway. The *aulos* had, it is true, a recognised role in Spartan military life. *Aulētai* were members of the royal entourage, and were required to play on ceremonial occasions and in celebration of victory (Xenophon, *Lac. Pol.* 13.8, *Hell.* 4.3.21, *Ages.* 2.15). But one may well ask why, if Thibron required a professional *aulētēs*, he did not bring one with him from Sparta, and why Thersandros, first heard of in Aiolis at the time of Thibron's first Asian campaign (though no meeting between them is reported), appears again in the Spartan commander's company (and, it seems, as his tent partner) 9–10 years later. Was this in fact a long-standing liaison of a more intimate kind?

<sup>61</sup> *Hell.* 4.8.22. At least in some quarters it was by his subservience to bodily pleasures that Thibron was remembered: Aristides (C. A. Behr) III, *To Plato, In Defence of the Four*, 202 (W. Dindorf, XLVI 2.176).

the example of sexual self-indulgence of which Vice is accused in Prodikos' fable. Not only does it involve using a grown man as a woman: Thibron also confounds the proper uses of day and night, spending the prime time of the morning, not, perhaps, in sleeping, but in what most Greeks would have regarded as a shameful form of sexual indulgence. Taken as a whole, the incident, like that of Alketas, illustrates Xenophon's moral concern with the dangers posed by *erōs* for a military commander. One might even argue that, given this interest, Xenophon's statement that Thibron and Thersandros were the *first* to be killed sounds more like an expression of moral retribution than a report of historical fact.

The reverse picture, the cost and the achievement of a triumphant *enkrateia*, is seen (in somewhat sycophantic light) in the famous incident of Agesilaos and Megabates, to which I now turn.

The story is told in chapter five of Xenophon's life of Agesilaos. Megabates was the handsome son of the Persian nobleman, Spithridates, whom Agesilaos had encountered on his campaign in and around Phrygia in 396–5 B.C. That the king's infatuation with Megabates was a well-remembered fact about him is attested by its appearance in the sober and economical pages of the Oxyrhynchus historian as well as in Xenophon.<sup>62</sup> But my interest is not so much in what may or may not have transpired between them as in the significance that the incident, as reported by Xenophon, has for the historian's view of the ideal leader. At first sight, the essential facts are that on some unspecified occasion Megabates approached Agesilaos to kiss him, but that with enormous effort Agesilaos rejected the approach, thus demonstrating his almost super-human self-control. Modern commentators seem generally to have taken the story at what seems to us to be its face-value as an illustration of Agesilaos' principles of personal morality. As Xenophon remarks later in his biography, Agesilaos' desires were directed to fine deeds rather than to fine bodies.<sup>63</sup> Such a view can appeal to the statement in Xenophon's *Lacedaemonian Constitution* that Lykourgos himself had forbidden Spartans to indulge in any physical expression of pederastic love, though it is doubtful how far these words reflect actual practice.<sup>64</sup> One may also recall the reflection on the dangers of yielding to the kiss of a beautiful boy which Xenophon attributes to Socrates.<sup>65</sup>

Yet, as in the case of Xenophon himself, whose narratives frequently fail to tally with his philosophical pronouncements on this subject,<sup>66</sup> there is evidence to suggest that Agesilaos did not hold to any simple and absolute condemnation of physical *erōs*. Xenophon twice tells us that he took pleasure in love stories about *paidika*.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>62</sup> *Hell. Oxyrh.* XXI 4. In addition, Xenophon informs us (*Hell.* 3.4.10) that Spithridates' defection from Pharnabazos had been brought about by Lysandros, who was operating in the Hellespont under Agesilaos' orders. The son is again mentioned.

<sup>63</sup> *Ages.* 11.10: *καλὸν ἔργον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐπιθυμῶν*. As a psychological description these words seem at the very least to gloss over the reality reflected in the graphic language of *Ages.* 5.4: *παῖδος ἐρασθέντα* (sc. τὸν Ἀγησίλαον) *ὥσπερ ἂν τοῦ καλλίστου ἢ σφοδροτάτῃ φύσει ἐρασθείη*.

<sup>64</sup> *Lac. Pol.* 2.13. Cf. the somewhat equivocal comments of K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*, pp. 191, 193–4. P. Cartledge has argued that whatever the status of the Lykourgan 'nomos' on pederastic chastity may have been (and Xenophon does not state that physical relationships were illegal), it was probably not observed in practice ('The Politics of Spartan Pederasty', pp. 19–22). Cf. G. Proietti, *Xenophon's Sparta: An Introduction* (Leiden, New York, Köln, 1987), p. 50.

<sup>65</sup> *Mem.* 1.3.8–13.

<sup>66</sup> Even in the discussion of Kritoboulos' kiss, Xenophon distances himself from Socrates with the comment that he himself might well take the risk of indulging.

<sup>67</sup> *Hell.* 5.3.20, *Age.* 8.2. That the phrase *παιδικοὶ λόγοι* means stories (or gossip) about *paidika* is indicated by *Cyrop.* 1.4.27. Cf. V. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, pp. 62f.



Such an interest is not in itself incompatible with personal abstention from, or indeed theoretical condemnation of, such *erōs* on the part of the interested person, though such a stance might imply a degree of hypocrisy. But the idea that Agesilaos was opposed to *erōs* of this kind simply on grounds of personal morality is hard to maintain in the face of the Spartan king's continued interest in the son of Pharnabazos, satrap of Phrygia. This interest arose out of an incident related by Xenophon in *Hellenica* 4.1.39–40.<sup>68</sup> Not only did Agesilaos exchange gifts with the young man as a token of guest-friendship, but at a later date, when the Persian had taken an Athenian youth as a lover, Agesilaos used his influence to bend the rules at Olympia to enable the young Athenian to be admitted to the *stadion* race. One can hardly apply the Lykourgan ideal of abstinence to relationships between a Persian and an Athenian, and the natural inference is that Agesilaos exerted himself to meet a request made by Pharnabazos' son, notwithstanding the latter's acknowledged relationship with his Athenian *paidika*.

But even without recourse to such inferences, a fuller reading of the text relating to Megabates' attempted kiss requires more than a moral objection to pederasty to explain it. For the story does not end with Xenophon's commendation of Agesilaos' self-control after his initial rebuff to Megabates. It moves on to a set of negotiations, in which Megabates demands a kiss for compliance, which Agesilaos refuses, affirming with an oath that he would rather fight again the same battle with his desire for the youth, than gain a miraculous cure for his lameness or find everything within sight turned to gold.

To set the stakes as high as that suggests, in terms of fourth century morality, that something more is involved than abstention from homoerotic indulgence. Megabates was no casual local beauty, but the son of Spithridates, a turn-coat Persian nobleman, who had entered a military alliance with Agesilaos against his former overlord, Pharnabazos, Persian satrap of Phrygia. Moreover, the incident of the kiss, with the involvement of courtiers in the negotiations, was not played out in private. For, says Xenophon, it was the Persian custom to kiss those whom they honour,<sup>69</sup> and honour is a matter of public recognition. Against this background, the Megabates incident takes on a strong political and diplomatic colouring, a conclusion which, I would argue, is borne out by a review of what Xenophon tells us elsewhere of Spithridates and his family.

According to Xenophon, Spithridates had formerly served under Pharnabazos, the satrap. The latter however had insulted him by seeking to take Spithridates' daughter as his concubine, while courting the hand of the Great King's daughter in marriage.<sup>70</sup> In consequence, Spithridates transferred his allegiance to Agesilaos, taking with him his daughter and also a handsome son, Megabates. The youth's beauty was one of the first things to attract comment from Agesilaos, and according to the Oxyrhynchus historian was the prime reason for Agesilaos giving a friendly welcome to Spithridates.<sup>71</sup> Seeking to build up a wider alliance against the Great King, Agesilaos proceeded to negotiate a marriage between Spithridates' daughter and the king of the neighbouring territory of Paphlagonia, Otys. Part of the bait, explicitly dangled by

<sup>68</sup> The incident occurred shortly after Agesilaos' break with Spithridates and his son Megabates (whose encounter with Agesilaos is discussed below), at a time when Agesilaos was seeking to develop a new alliance with Pharnabazos against the Great King.

<sup>69</sup> *Ages.* 5.4.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.* 3.3. The wording (*Φαρνάβαζος... ἄνευ γάμου λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο*) might be taken to imply that Spithridates had been frustrated in an attempt to achieve a marriage alliance with Pharnabazos.

<sup>71</sup> Xenophon, *Hell.* 4.1.6, *Hell. Oxyrh.* 21.4.

Agesilaos, was the political advantage to Otys of an alliance, not merely with Spithridates, who was a powerless exile, but with Agesilaos and through him with the Spartans and with the rest of Greece which, Agesilaos claimed, was under Spartan control.<sup>72</sup> We are here firmly in the territory of the political marriage, and from Spithridates' point of view, living as he was in a dispossessed state of exile, a link by marriage with Otys would be politically a most welcome prize.<sup>73</sup>

If Spithridates was thus willing to use his daughter in furthering his political aims, may he not have been equally willing to foster a pederastic liaison for his son with similar motives? There are precedents for such a policy elsewhere in the world of the fourth century, since, as Paul Cartledge has argued, the seeking of political advantage through a pederastic liaison was not unknown in Sparta. It was probably a factor in Lysandros' position as *erastēs* to the young Agesilaos, as reported by Plutarch, and in the development of the liaison between Agesilaos' son, Archidamos, and Kleonymos, son of Sphodrias.<sup>74</sup> Xenophon's account of this relationship in connexion with the Sphodrias affair, though later in date than Agesilaos' Asia campaigns, is worth examining for the light it throws on the historian's view of such liaisons.

Sphodrias, a Spartan commander, was, it will be recalled, charged with a capital offence for damaging Sparta's interests by leading an unauthorised raid into Athenian territory.<sup>75</sup> He failed to appear to stand trial, thereby admitting his guilt, but was nevertheless acquitted through the intervention of Agesilaos. To account for that intervention, Xenophon provides a circumstantial narrative to the effect that Agesilaos' son, Archidamos, was the *erastēs* of Sphodrias' son, Kleonymos, and that Archidamos had been thereby led to intercede with the king on behalf of his *paidika*'s father. The story ends with Sphodrias acquitted, and Kleonymos in gratitude pledging eternal fidelity to Archidamos, redeeming that pledge with his life at the battle of Leuctra. The reason for Agesilaos' intervention, however, is 'not unambiguously clear, and his position changes in the course of the narrative. Having at first opposed Archidamos' plea for acquittal, he later (according to the report of a third party, Etymokles (§32)) let it be known that in his view Sparta could not afford to lose the services of a soldier with Sphodrias' distinguished record and qualities, and this was taken as a signal for acquittal. As Sphodrias belonged to the circle of the Agiad king, Kleombrotos, one might then see in the incident an example of Agesilaos seeking to nullify domestic political opposition by the shrewd deployment of patronage, while discounting the part played by the love affair in the story.<sup>76</sup> But while this interpretation may represent the historical reality behind the narrative, it can hardly without more ado be taken to represent Xenophon's view of the matter.

<sup>72</sup> Xenophon, *Hell.* 4.1.8. I. A. F. Bruce has argued that the marriage may not have had as great a political importance as Xenophon suggests (I. A. F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia'* [Cambridge, 1967], p. 144). But it is Xenophon's view of the matter which is relevant for my argument.

<sup>73</sup> Xenophon, *Hell.* 4.1.4.

<sup>74</sup> P. Cartledge, 'The Politics of Spartan Pederasty', pp. 28–9.

<sup>75</sup> The story of the raid and subsequent negotiations over Sphodrias' acquittal is told in considerable detail in Xenophon, *Hell.* 5.4.20–33.

<sup>76</sup> So Cartledge argues, *op. cit.* p. 29. In his book *Sparta and Lakonia* (London, 1979), p. 295, Cartledge also points out that shortage of manpower is given as a reason for suspending the law under which those guilty of cowardice at Leuctra might have been punished, citing Plutarch, *Agesilaos* 30.6 and *Moralia*, 191C, 214B.

Vivienne Gray (*The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, pp. 61–2) sees the love between Archidamos and Kleonymos and the loyalty which it engenders as the main point of the story, while recognising the conflict between that love and the demands of just administration of the law.

To begin with, Xenophon introduces the episode with the statement that many people considered that this was 'the most unjust verdict given in a Spartan court.'<sup>77</sup> While not presenting this as his own view, he does nothing to dissociate himself from it. He then passes to his lengthy exposition of the love affair with the words, 'this was the reason for it.' A similar phrase ends the narrative. On each occasion, the close association of these phrases with the account of the pederastic affair suggests that the latter provided the explanation of the acquittal. The narrative does not require us to believe that Agesilaos was uninfluenced by the lover's plea: merely that he arranged that no such influence should be apparent. The king's first reaction is, of course, to reject the plea: he might forgive Archidamos for asking, but the city would never forgive him (Agesilaos) for yielding (§30). Nothing is said subsequently to modify his condemnation of Sphodrias, as a man who had made money by causing harm to the city.<sup>78</sup> Yet, in response to Archidamos' second approach Agesilaos begins to waver, saying, 'Very well, provided that the affair is likely to turn out well for us' (§31). Archidamos takes this as a refusal – since, presumably, the condition seems incapable of fulfilment. Alternatively, it suggests that Agesilaos is looking for a face-saving formula. It is this, I would suggest, that represents the underlying intention of the word spread about by Agesilaos' friends (without, it appears, any formal declaration by the king) that Agesilaos had been heard to say that Sparta could not afford to lose a man of Sphodrias' calibre, despite his acknowledged guilt. Finally, the impassioned commitment of Kleonymos never to besmirch Archidamos' honour, surely reflects the debt of gratitude which Kleonymos is represented as feeling as a result of Archidamos' intercession.

The conclusion would seem to be that for Xenophon, at least, the story was what it appears on the surface to be: an illustration of family pressure arising from a pederastic liaison, leading to a shameful political decision. That he was embarrassed by having to acknowledge such behaviour on the part of his paragon, Agesilaos, is shown both by the very indirect way in which it comes out that Agesilaos had acquiesced in Sphodrias' acquittal, and by the fact that the incident is entirely omitted from Xenophon's life of the king.

If, in Xenophon's view, a pederastic affair might be a source of improper political pressure, must not the acknowledgement of *erōs* between Agesilaos and Megabates have been seen to carry just such risks, to the great detriment of Sparta? Would not such a relationship, from Spithridates' point of view, have seemed as potentially advantageous as the marriage of his daughter to Otys? Such a hypothesis seems to me to account for the nuances of the exchange between Agesilaos and Megabates as Xenophon presents it.

The story is introduced to illustrate Agesilaos' iron self-control in refusing the attractions of Megabates, and that indeed it does. But if it were solely a question of personal morality, it is very difficult to explain why Agesilaos was not willing to bring the incident to a close with his refusal of the kiss. The young man might feel slighted, but why should his sulking reaction concern the king and lead him, apparently, to seek a continuance of the relationship (albeit, presumably, on fresh terms), and expose himself again to the temptation which he had repudiated at some cost? The answer must lie in the political implications of the situation. For Agesilaos to accept

<sup>77</sup> *Hell.* 5.4.24.

<sup>78</sup> *Hell.* 5.4.30. The reference is to the charge of bribery which Xenophon had previously reported merely as a suspicion (*Ibid.* §20), but here seems to accept as well-founded. Furthermore, even Agesilaos' reported support for clemency is prefaced by the statement that there is no way of denying Sphodrias' guilt (§32).

a rebuff from the son of his new-found Persian ally would undermine his authority within the alliance. He must therefore exact a recognition of his position from Megabates. In this way we can understand Agesilaos' reaction, and indeed the fact that he is prepared to use a courtier as intermediary to negotiate.

But at this point the hidden agenda of Megabates (and behind him, one may suppose, Spithridates) becomes apparent. Supposing, asks the courtier, Megabates agreed to pay him honour, would Agesilaos kiss him? The kiss is now the price of Megabates' being willing to restore the honour due to the king. The most obvious explanation of this manoeuvre, particularly when we remember that in such affairs the *erōmenos* is not expected to reciprocate the passion of his *erastēs*, is that Megabates is seeking to attain a political end. The kiss would signify an acknowledgment of the youth as Agesilaos' *paidika*, which might well open the way for the dispossessed Persian exile, Megabates' father, to exert influence upon the Spartan king.<sup>79</sup> It is this possibility which explains the quasi-political process of negotiation and the strong language with which Agesilaos resists for the second time: his honour and authority as king and commander of his city's army is more important than the healing of his lameness or the acquisition of the Midas touch (let alone the pleasure of sleeping with Megabates).

This analysis requires some reading between the lines. But the traditional view, which sees here nothing beyond a judgment on the morality of pederasty is obliged simply to ignore substantial elements in the narrative. In offering an alternative analysis I do not wish to imply that Agesilaos was not deeply attracted to the young man, or that he did not indeed exercise remarkable, even heroic, self-restraint in refusing to accept him as a lover. What is at issue is the motivation for this stand. It was not, I suggest, based upon a moralistic condemnation of pederastic love, but on the perceived duties of a commander in chief, who must avoid rendering himself open to improper pressure. The morality involved is a morality of military and political duty, not a morality of sexual acts *per se*. Thus understood, the incident of Megabates' kiss fits well into the framework provided by our earlier examples, while without some such hypothesis it seems very difficult to explain the extraordinary amount of self-conscious negotiation which the story records.<sup>80</sup>

The opportunities for homoerotic pleasure available to Greek armies and their commanders in the field must have been many, and the resulting relationships complex. As I have argued at the outset, Xenophon recognised that such relationships might well be honourable, and motivate men to valour in battle. But experience also taught him that situations could well arise where to indulge in *erōs* was fraught with military or political danger. In such situations, he had no doubt that the welfare of the city should take precedence over individual impulse, and for him the ability to resist

<sup>79</sup> Further speculation is provoked by the curious discrepancy between what Xenophon says about Persian etiquette at *Ages.* 5.4 and at *Cyrop.* 1.4.27–8. In the former passage we are told that it is customary for Persians to kiss those whom they honour; but in the latter, the Persian kiss is reserved for kinsmen. Could it be that Megabates was seeking to assert a relation of kinship, or quasi-kinship, which Agesilaos might find even more embarrassing? If so, Xenophon might have understandably glossed over the full implication of the proffered kiss, by substituting 'honour' for 'kinship' as the motivating principle.

<sup>80</sup> It is more than likely that another instance of gaining advancement through a pederastic liaison is to be found in the story of the infamous Thessalian, Menon. Xenophon records of him that it was public knowledge that while still in the bloom of youth he got Aristippos to put him in command of the mercenaries: *παρὰ Ἀριστίππου μὲν ἔτι ὥραϊος ὢν στρατηγεῖν διεπράξετο τῶν ξένων*. When in the same sentence Xenophon refers explicitly to Menon's other love affairs, it is natural to infer that his youthful beauty is what persuaded Aristippos to give him the command (*Anab.* 2.6.28. For Aristippos, see *Anab.* 1.1.10).

erotic desire where necessary ranked high among the qualities required by a military leader. Some failed the test, and, like Alketas and Thibron, brought military reverses upon their city. Others, like Agesilaos in his relations with Megabates, survived the test with honour, and this was not the least of Xenophon's reasons for according him high praise.

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## XENOPHON ON MALE LOVE

In a previous article I attempted to trace the way in which, for Xenophon, homosexual liaisons might or might not affect the discipline of military life, and the emphasis which he placed upon the virtue of self-control (ἐγκράτεια) in dealing with desires of this kind.<sup>1</sup> The present paper seeks to broaden the enquiry into a study of Xenophon's attitude to male same-sex affairs in general.

Following the recognition that Plato's discussions of pederasty are quite unrepresentative of Athenian society as a whole, recent scholarship has concentrated on vase paintings and on the orators who, as Sir Kenneth Dover has taught us, embody in their speeches the values which would appeal to an Athenian jury. Xenophon meanwhile has to some extent fallen between two stools. Relegated to the second rank as a writer and thinker behind Thukudides and Plato, he nevertheless fails to be representative of the common man. On questions of male love, his writings have been excavated for citations to supplement general views on the Greek outlook, but the distinction between Sokrates and Xenophon has often been disregarded, or perhaps thought incapable of definition.<sup>2</sup> Other scholars have regarded Xenophon's writings as a source for the 'historical Sokrates', while showing little interest in the views of Xenophon himself. More recently, there has been a tendency to regard Xenophon as opposed to pederasty (or at least its physical expression) outright.<sup>3</sup>

The time may therefore be ripe for a fresh attempt to discover just what Xenophon believed on this subject. He belongs to an important group in Athenian society, the upper-class gentry who, while not aspiring to the heights of Platonic philosophy, might be prepared to think about their relationships with boys. Moreover, his very position in the second rank as a man of letters embodies a positive virtue for the social historian who is seeking to map the views of Greek society at large. I do not claim in any simplistic sense that Xenophon can be held to embody those views, but he provides an interesting specimen for dissection. Granted the limitations of his class background, his experience of life was wide-ranging—from military service in Asia Minor and Thrace to the pursuits of a retired country gentleman at Skillous. He knew the life of Athens and Sparta, and, to some extent, that of the Persian Empire and of Thrace. In his retreat at Skillous he developed a variety of interests which are reflected in his multifarious treatises. He shows himself aware of the different traditions within Greece regarding pederasty,<sup>4</sup> and his narratives include glancing references to a

<sup>1</sup> C. Hindley, 'EROS and military command in Xenophon', *CQ* 44 (1994), 347–366.

<sup>2</sup> Both Sir Kenneth Dover and Michel Foucault, from their different viewpoints, handle the material in this way. See K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (London, 1978); M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 2: *The Use of Pleasure*, trans. R. Hurley (Harmondsworth, 1986). The relationship of Sokrates to the tradition about him over many areas of interest has been much illuminated by the volume of essays edited by P. A. Vander Waerdt, *The Socratic Movement* (Ithaca and London, 1994).

<sup>3</sup> E. Cantarella, *Bisexuality in the Ancient World*, trans. Cormac Ó Cuilleain (New Haven and London, 1992), pp. 63f. B. S. Thornton, *EROS: The Myth of Ancient Greek Sexuality* (Boulder, 1997), pp. 103, 202f.

<sup>4</sup> *Lac. Pol.* 2.12–13. The omission of Athens here is intriguing and hard to explain, though it is to some extent (and in a very different context) repaired in Sokrates' discourse at *Symposium* 8.32–4. Unless otherwise specified, the title *Symposium* in this article refers to Xenophon's work of that name.

number of other Hellenic societies. Moreover, in addition to the set-piece discussions of love in the *Memorabilia* and the *Symposium*, many of his references to manifestations of ἔρως are in the nature of parenthetical narratives or *obiter dicta*, seemingly uncoloured by the rhetorical or metaphysical purposes of an Aiskhines or a Plato. Elsewhere Xenophon provides annotations which, however jejune they may be, at least allow inferences to be drawn about the author's own ethical stance.

I propose therefore to examine the few passages in which Xenophon speaks *in propria persona*, his editorial comments, the implications of his narratives, and the extent to which he seems to identify with, or stand aside from, the various more formal discussions of pederasty attributed to others in his writings. It is to be hoped that what emerges is a reasonably rounded picture of the views held by an experienced observer of male same-sex relationships in the world of his time, and a contribution to understanding that ποικίλια which, following Plato's Pausanias, recent observers have emphasized as characteristic of the Athenian scene.

Several passages make clear Xenophon's recognition of the power of sexual desire. Notably, in the fifth chapter of *Agesilaos* the king is said to have shown almost superhuman self-control in resisting Megabates, though his love for the youth was of the kind displayed by a most passionate nature (σφοδροτάτη φύσις) for the loveliest of boys. Indeed, concludes Xenophon, 'It seems to me that many more men are able to gain the mastery over their enemies than over such passions.' This is a matter of 'nature' (φύσις), which, as commonly used, refers to a person's settled character.<sup>5</sup> The term may extend to human nature at large, as when Hieron (and behind him I think we can hear Xenophon) is made to say that his love for Daïlokhos is perhaps driven by a natural compulsion.<sup>6</sup> Elsewhere, children, wives, or παιδικά are grouped together as objects of a similar 'natural compulsion' to love.<sup>7</sup> The passages so far mentioned carry no implication that a person may be more inclined to homosexual than to heterosexual relations (or vice versa), but Xenophon seems elsewhere to come near to what we mean by 'sexual orientation' in speaking of Episthenes as a παιδεραστής, whose τρόπος can be explained to Seuthes by reference to his cohort of beautiful youths.<sup>8</sup> Dover points out that the compulsion of love is described in the same terms as same-sex desire in the heterosexual story of the Persian Araspas.<sup>9</sup> Interestingly, however, as

<sup>5</sup> *Ages.* 5.4 and 6. See also *Symposium* 8.8, where Sokrates admires Kallias' character. The reason for Agesilaos' restraint was, I believe, not a moral objection to pederasty, but the risk of diplomatic entanglement with an ambitious Persian family (see Hindley [n. 1], pp. 361–5). On the wider literary background for the power of Aphrodite/Eros, see James Davidson, *Courtesans and Fishcakes* (London, 1997), pp. 159ff.

<sup>6</sup> *Hiero* 1.33. Cf. Dover (n. 2), pp. 61f. Also, for the meaning of 'nature', see K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Indianapolis, 1994), pp. 88–95.

For Hieron as mouthpiece of Xenophon, see below p. 89.

<sup>7</sup> *Cyrop.* 7.5.60: the term for 'love' here is φιλεῖν, but surely in the case of wives and παιδικά it does not exclude ἐρᾶν. (Cf. Dover [n. 2], pp. 49–50, on the overlap between φιλία and ἔρως.)

At *Mem.* 2.6.21 friendship or hostility toward others are matters of 'nature'.

<sup>8</sup> *Anab.* 7.4.7–8. Cf. Dover (n. 2), pp. 51, 62. Xenophon's text is grammatically ambiguous as to who raised the cohort of καλοί. To my mind the more likely candidate, on balance, is Episthenes. But contrast D. Ogden, 'Homosexuality and warfare in Ancient Greece', in A. B. Lloyd (ed.), *Battle in Antiquity* (London, 1996), p. 126.

For τρόπος as an individual's character, cf. *Cyrop.* 8.3.49, and as a national characteristic, *Cyrop.* 2.2.28.

<sup>9</sup> *Cyrop.* 5.1. 8–18. The passage provides another example of Xenophon speaking through his characters: for while at *Cyrop.* 2.2.28 Kuros is depicted as deriding a courtier for appearing to have a παιδικά in the Greek fashion, he speaks in *Cyrop.* 5.1.12 as though homosexual relationships were entirely on a par with heterosexual ones.



soon as the discussion here turns to the power of love in general (§12), the genders of lover and beloved both become masculine. This grammatical shift may not necessarily indicate all-male relationships, but it surely includes them.<sup>10</sup> The language of the paragraph as a whole (with its repeated references to *ἐρώμενοι*) is strongly reminiscent of male same-sex contexts, where the compulsions of love are felt as strongly as in the heterosexual arena.

Xenophon makes an important distinction between sex with and sex without *ἔρως*. The latter (*τὰ ἀφροδίσια* or *λαγνεία*) is treated as a mere bodily appetite, on a par with other bodily appetites, such as hunger and thirst. This catalogue is mentioned with numbing regularity by Xenophon's Sokrates, and at *Mem.* 2.1.1 Xenophon himself implicitly acknowledges its validity.<sup>11</sup> The sexual appetite may be satisfied quite casually—without any thought of procreation—and, Sokrates observes, the streets are full of those who are willing to oblige.<sup>12</sup> The gender of the object of desire is immaterial. Thus, the philosopher Antisthenes, when his body craves relief, is satisfied with whoever (or perhaps 'whatever'—*τὸ παρόν*) is available, including women whom no one else will visit.<sup>13</sup>

Beyond (but including) this bodily appetite lies *ἔρως*, which Dover defines as 'the obsessive focussing of desire upon one person'.<sup>14</sup> Xenophon makes Hieron speak of the much greater pleasure to be obtained from *τὰ μετ' ἔρωτος ἀφροδίσια*,<sup>15</sup> and is clearly happy to romanticize relationships based on *ἔρως*. When Episthenes (the *παιδεραστής* whom he encountered in Thrace) was on the point of offering his own life in exchange for that of a beautiful youth, Xenophon readily came to his aid, and praised the valour he had shown alongside his company of young men.

He also takes obvious pleasure in recounting the *παιδικὸς λόγος* of the Median nobleman who steals a kiss from the young and handsome Kuros, and for whom a mere blink which deprives him of the sight of Kuros seems an eternity.<sup>16</sup> Most notably, he provides a lyrical description of the effect of Autolukos' beauty on Kallias and the assembled company at the opening of his *Symposium*, himself making the comment that 'those who are inspired by a temperate love (*σώφρων ἔρως*) have a kindlier look, a gentler voice, and show a more unconstrained bearing'. A modern moralist might conclude from this idealistic eulogy that physical sex is out of the question between Kallias and Autolukos. But the opposite implication is clearly made later in the

<sup>10</sup> On the ambivalence of the masculine grammatical gender, see R. Kühner and B. Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, Satzlehre, Erster Teil* (Vierte Auflage, Hannover, 1955), §371.1, p. 82.

<sup>11</sup> *Mem.* 2.1.1: 'Ἐδόκει δέ μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων προτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ λαγνείας καὶ ὕπνου κτλ. This alignment between sex and other bodily appetites is well analysed in Foucault's *The Use of Pleasure* (n. 2 above). It is given great prominence by Davidson in relation to Athenian society as a whole (n. 5 above).

By the phrase 'Xenophon's Sokrates' I mean the teachings attributed by Xenophon to Sokrates, whether or not the historical Sokrates actually held them. For convenience the name 'Sokrates' is used with this meaning (unless indicated otherwise) throughout this article.

<sup>12</sup> *Mem.* 2.2.4–5. Cf. *Mem.* 2.1.5, where would-be adulterers are counselled (in the interest of avoiding awkward entanglements) to resort to a prostitute—*ὄντων δὲ πολλῶν τῶν ἀπολυσόντων τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίας*. In both passages the masculine participle may include women, but *πόρνοι* were readily available: see D. M. Halperin, 'The democratic body: prostitution and citizenship in Classical Athens', in *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality* (New York and London, 1990), pp. 88–112. For resort to boys on the part of a frustrated married man, cf. also Euripides, *Medea* 249 (Dover [n. 2], p. 171, n. 2).

<sup>13</sup> *Sympos.* 4.38.

<sup>14</sup> Dover (n. 2), p. 63.

<sup>15</sup> *Hiero* 1.29.

<sup>16</sup> *Cyrop.* 1.4.27–28.

dialogue. For when Sokrates praises Kallias' love as Ouranian and directed to the *ψυχή*, Hermogenes astutely interrupts to praise Sokrates' skill in admonishing Kallias while seeming to praise him. If, in Hermogenes' submission, Sokrates has to instruct Kallias as to *οἷον περὶ χρῆν εἶναι*, it follows that hitherto his conduct has not met Sokrates' standard. One naturally concludes that the *σώφρων ἔρως* attributed to Kallias (by Xenophon) included physical intimacy in some form.<sup>17</sup>

At the same time, Xenophon is aware of the potential of physical desire, particularly in its homosexual form, for undermining the right ordering of military and political affairs. This much emerges from the contrast between his portrayal of the Spartan Thibron, a general who (as I believe the text implies) was destroyed by his uncontrolled desire for bodily pleasure, and that of Agesilaos, who amazingly resisted such desires. Another Spartan commander, Alketas, could betray his post for an attractive boy, while the tyrannical Iason of Pherae could be praised as *ἐγκρατέστατος* ... *τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡδονῶν*.<sup>18</sup>

Awareness of the potentially anarchic power of *τὰ ἀφροδίσια* is a major factor in Xenophon's admiration for the virtue of *ἐγκράτεια*. It is for him *καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρὶ κτῆμα*. These words introduce a chapter in which, at the climax of a paean to self-control in every department of life, he makes Sokrates call self-control 'the foundation of virtue' (*ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπίδα*). This thought is reinforced, in the concluding paragraph, with Xenophon's own commendation: *τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγων [ὁ Σωκράτης] ἔτι ἐγκρατέστερον τοῖς ἔργοις ἢ τοῖς λόγοις ἑαυτὸν ἐπεδείκνυνεν*. Moreover, this perception of Sokrates forms the centrepiece of Xenophon's rebuttal of the charge that the philosopher corrupted the young.<sup>19</sup>

In Book 4 of the *Memorabilia*, the analysis is carried further to show that such self-control is also true freedom, because it enables a man to do what is right, rather than be enslaved to his passions,<sup>20</sup> a view endorsed by Xenophon as Sokrates' way of making his companions better fitted for action (*πρακτικωτέρους*). Conversely, Sokrates can claim that many have been destroyed through passions aroused by physical attraction,<sup>21</sup> an observation Xenophon himself had made earlier, with some emphasis (*καγὼ δὲ μαρτυρῶ τούτοις*), at *Mem.* 1.2.21–3. In regard to love, such men are described (by Xenophon) as *οἱ εἰς ἔρωτας ἐγκυλισθέντες*,<sup>22</sup> and Sokrates' way of dealing with them is illustrated in the incident of Kritias and Euthudemos. Sokrates, it

<sup>17</sup> See *Sympos.* 1.10, and Hermogenes' interjection at *Sympos.* 8.12. The phrase *σώφρων ἔρως* is paralleled in the *δίκαιος ἔρως* of Aiskhines 1.136, and a number of other expressions and relationships noted at n. 88 below. Also, see the analysis of 'reverence' in Kritoboulos' speech, p. 88 below.

<sup>18</sup> See Hindley (n. 1) for a more detailed examination of these examples. The main references are: *Hell.* 4.8.18–19, *Ages.* 5, *Hell.* 5.4.56–57, 6.1.16. The description of Iason is found in the speech of the admittedly partial Poludamas of Pharsalos, possibly Xenophon's informant on Thessalian affairs (cf. G. Cawkwell, Introduction to *Xenophon: A History of My Times*, trans. R. Warner [Harmondsworth, 1979, p. 26]. The important point here is the probability (based on Xenophon's laudatory introduction—*Hell.* 6.1.2–3) that the historian would have endorsed Poludamas' judgement. He himself makes a similar comment about Diphridas, Thibron's successor in Asia (*Hell.* 4.8.22).

For a survey of homosexuality in Greek armies generally, see Ogden (n. 8).

<sup>19</sup> *Mem.* 1.5.1, 1.5.4, 1.5.6. For the general argument, compare Foucault (n. 2), esp. Part 1.3. On the potential danger of wasting money on *παιδικά*, see *Mem.* 1.2.21–3.

For corruption of the young, see *Mem.* 1.2.1.

<sup>20</sup> *Mem.* 4.5.1–3. Cf. *Mem.* 2.1.3.

<sup>21</sup> *Mem.* 4.2.35.

<sup>22</sup> *Mem.* 1.2.22. For the language, compare Sokrates' words (during the discussion of military pederasty) about Pausanias, as *ἀπολογούμενος ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀκρασία ἐγκαλινδουμένων* (*Sympos.* 8.32).

will be remembered, rebuked Kritias for approaching his *παιδικά*, Euthudemos, like a piglet scratching itself against a stone.<sup>23</sup> A number of factors however, in addition to Kritias' desire to enjoy physical intimacy with Euthudemos, may be thought to have contributed to a sharpening of Sokrates' criticism. In the first place, as paragraph 30 makes clear, the incident took place in public, though a degree of privacy for sex was usually thought desirable.<sup>24</sup> Equally open to criticism in Sokrates' view was Kritias' behaviour in abasing himself before his *παιδικά*, which displayed a slavish attitude not befitting a free man. Finally, the narrative implies that Kritias' purpose was confined to τὰ ἀφροδίσια. Though he is said to 'love' (ἐρᾶν) Euthudemos, his passion seems to be limited to that of one who was attempting to use the boy physically (πειρῶντα χρῆσθαι, καθάπερ οἱ πρὸς τὰφροδίσια τῶν σωμάτων ἀπολαύοντες).<sup>25</sup> These factors would also explain why Xenophon (who, as we shall see, does not share Sokrates' outright rejection of all homosexual copulation) also condemned Kritias' action. For such condemnation seems clearly implied in Xenophon's introduction to the incident, where the words φαῦλα πράττοντας are naturally taken as reflecting Xenophon's own as well as his mentor's judgement.<sup>26</sup>

One reason for reporting the Kritias incident at this point is to demonstrate how in Xenophon's view Kritias (and also Alkibiades) were restrained by Sokrates and deteriorated when they parted company with him.<sup>27</sup> This is not simply a matter of private morality, but reveals ἐγκράτεια as crucial for political leadership. Xenophon not only claims that Sokrates' public humiliation of Kritias explains the latter's hostility to the philosopher when he came to power as one of the Thirty Tyrants. But we are also, I think, invited to infer that Kritias' ἀκρασία in sexual matters (aggravated, no doubt by the bad company he had kept in Thessaly) was symptomatic of one who, when deprived of Sokrates' restraining influence, could perpetrate the atrocities of the Thirty.<sup>28</sup>

At the beginning of the second book of the *Memorabilia*, Sokrates, in conversation with the philosopher Aristippos (an apolitical hedonist), raises the question, what kind of young man is fit to be entrusted with government.<sup>29</sup> The argument ranges widely, but insofar as it concerns the control of sexual appetite, it proceeds from assumptions very different from those we are accustomed to make. There is no discussion of the 'morality' or otherwise of sexual acts in whatever context. Instead, Sokrates concentrates on the duty to participate in public life and rebuts Aristippos' suggestion that a man may honourably decline to play this role. From this perspective, the control of sexual desire is advocated simply with a view to ensuring that a man is

<sup>23</sup> *Mem.* 1.2.29–31. For the imagery, cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 494c–e, on which see J. J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire* (New York and London, 1990), p. 53.

<sup>24</sup> For privacy and sex, see Halperin (n. 12), p. 91 and p. 182, n. 28.

<sup>25</sup> For *πειράω* in relation to sexual seduction, compare Hipparkhos' 'attempts' on Harmodios' honour, Thucyd. 6.54.3 and 4 (two separate occasions). Cf. also Xen. *Hiero* 11.11.

<sup>26</sup> *Mem.* 1.2.29: ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ μηδὲν αὐτὸς πονηρὸν ποιῶν ἐκείνους φαῦλα πράττοντας δρῶν ἐπ' ἡγήναι, δικαίως ἂν ἐπιτιμῶτο.

<sup>27</sup> *Mem.* 1.2.24.

<sup>28</sup> Davidson (n. 5, ch. 9) has recently analysed the link between physical self-indulgence in matters of food and sex and the practice of tyranny in politics.

<sup>29</sup> *Mem.* 2.1.1–20. The nature of the elder Aristippos' teaching is obscure: cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *Socrates* (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 170ff. It would be interesting, however, if he had, as Diogenes Laertius avers, formulated the principle, τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ μὴ ἡττάσθαι ἡδονῶν ἀριστον, οὐ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι. In formal terms, at least, this is close to what I believe Xenophon's position to have been. (Diogenes Laertius 2.75: cf. Foucault [n. 2], p. 70.)

not deflected from doing his public duty.<sup>30</sup> The dialogue with Aristippos prepares the way for the discussion of virtue embodied in the fable of Herakles' Choice, attributed to Prodikos, which Xenophon now reproduces, and which develops further the theme of self-discipline as a requirement for proper participation in public life.<sup>31</sup>

Xenophon himself, in his introductory sentence to the second book of the *Memorabilia*, presents the Sokratic teaching which follows, first in dialogue with Aristippos and then in the fable of Prodikos, as an ideal to be followed. It is thus that (according to Xenophon) Sokrates encouraged his associates to practice self-discipline in respect of all bodily appetites. It is all with a view to achieving great things in public affairs, an argument which reaches its most eloquent expression in the final discourse in the *Symposium*. Kallias is exhorted to practise virtue in the city's service, and there can be little doubt that for Sokrates this requires keeping his relationship with Autolukos on a purely non-physical plane.

The question of total abstinence, however, has hardly been raised in the passages so far reviewed. In the case of food and drink it would be a recipe for suicide, as the down-to-earth Aristippos points out.<sup>32</sup> The test here, therefore, is whether at any given time bodily needs demand reasonable satisfaction, and one recalls the words of Virtue in the fable of Herakles' Choice, where she berates Vice for artificially stimulating appetites (for food, sex, and sleep) when there is no need.<sup>33</sup> A similar test can be applied to sexual indulgence, but it is obviously too simple to transfer the regimen appropriate to food and drink to τὰ ἀφροδίδια without more ado. Life can survive celibacy, and there is a number of passages where Xenophon represents Sokrates as advocating total abstinence from sexual relations with boys. The simplest and clearest statement is at *Mem.* 1.3.8: ἀφροδισίων δὲ παρῆναι τῶν καλῶν ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέχεσθαι.<sup>34</sup> Sokrates' own practice is summarized later in the same chapter: αὐτὸς δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα φανερός ἦν οὕτω παρεσκευασμένος ὥστε ῥᾶον ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν καλλίστων καὶ ὠραιστάτων ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν αἰσχίστων καὶ ἁωροτάτων.<sup>35</sup> It is also

The discussion here touches on the broader philosophical question of hedonism. Harold A. S. Tarrant has recently suggested that the formula 'mastery not abstention' reflects the moderating influence of Sokrates' teaching on Aristippos, who may originally have advocated a more extreme hedonism: see H. A. S. Tarrant, 'The *Hippias Major* and Sokrates' theories of pleasure', in Vander Vaerdt (n. 2), p. 124. See also Tarrant's discussion of 'moderate hedonism' in Xenophon's presentation of Sokrates (pp. 121ff.).

For the importance of political involvement in the discussion with Aristippos, and the role of self-control in this sphere, cf. D. K. O'Connor, 'The erotic self-sufficiency of Sokrates', in Vander Vaerdt (n. 2), pp. 159–163: 'Aristippos' indifference to politics rather than his hedonism is Sokrates' primary target' (p. 160).

<sup>30</sup> *Mem.* 2.1.3. Love for a woman can be equally distracting—*Cyrop.* 5.1.8.

<sup>31</sup> *Mem.* 2.1.21–34.

<sup>32</sup> *Mem.* 2.1.1.

<sup>33</sup> *Mem.* 2.1.30. The strictures against male love here are, I believe, restricted to anal intercourse between adult males, cf. Hindley (n. 1), p. 349. Cf. also *Mem.* 1.3.5–6.

<sup>34</sup> Καλῶν here must surely be masculine. Not only is it picked up by τοιούτων in the following line, but the whole ensuing discussion revolves around boys, and its conclusion (§13) generalizes the message in explicitly masculine terms (. . . ὅποταν ἴδῃς τινὰ καλόν). Given the context, one must also allow for the influence of the καλός—inscriptions on vases: of Robinson and Fluck's list of 283 'love-names' (give or take one or two of doubtful gender) only about 34 (12%) are female. See D. M. Robinson and E. J. Fluck, *A Study of the Greek Love-names* (Baltimore, 1937).

For the sentiment, cf. *Mem.* 2.6.32, 4.2.35, *Sympos.* 4.54. The 'appeasing appetite' argument is applied heterosexually to Antisthenes (*Sympos.* 4.38), but Sokrates nowhere, I think, contemplates celibacy as total abstinence from women. Indeed, as a married man and a father he could hardly do so. But heterosexual intercourse may be justified more for its role in the procreation of children and the raising of a family than for its pleasure (*Mem.* 2.2.4).

<sup>35</sup> *Mem.* 1.3.14. Cf. also *Mem.* 4.1.2.

to be noted that in Virtue's speech in the Fable of Herakles, at the place where one might expect a positive appraisal of honourable boy-love, one in fact finds Virtue claiming to be ἀρίστη φιλίας κοινωνός.<sup>36</sup> It is of course given to Sokrates to narrate the fable, and the sentiment here is a succinct summary of the thrust of Sokrates' speech in the *Symposium*, exhorting Kallias to develop a wholly non-physical love towards Autolukos. This is the same Sokrates that we find in the famous anecdote of Alkibiades' unsuccessful attempt at seduction, and there can, I imagine, be little dissent from Sir Kenneth Dover's conclusion that the Sokrates of both Xenophon and Plato condemns homosexual copulation.<sup>37</sup>

Did, then, Xenophon himself, with all his veneration for Sokrates, accept this ban on physical intimacy between homosexual lovers? Key passages are the discussions with and about Kritoboulos in the *Memorabilia* and the *Symposium*. But by way of background it is worth recalling aspects of Xenophon's own experience and knowledge which must have helped form his judgement.

Xenophon's emergence as a general after the battle of Cunaxa and the death of Klearkhos indicates considerable powers of leadership in a perilous situation, and it is natural to assume that this experience helped shape his concern with leadership in his later historical writing. Certainly there are examples in the *Anabasis* of his exhibiting the virtues of physical self-discipline which he was later to advocate.<sup>38</sup> Did he also discern, in some of his contemporaries, a growth of indiscipline in personal attitudes which he thought required to be challenged by the succession of sermons in the *Memorabilia*? He certainly allows Perikles, son of the great statesman, to reflect pessimistically on the decline of Athens,<sup>39</sup> and it is the quest for the qualities needed for political and military leadership (with a heavy emphasis on self-control) which informs much of the *Memorabilia*.<sup>40</sup>

However, while the perils of uncontrolled desire on the part of a military commander were apparent, ἔρως could also inspire loyalty, devotion, and heroism. One recalls the παιδικά of the Spartan general Anaxibios, who stood by his ἑραστής as he fought to the death;<sup>41</sup> or the devotion of the Greek soldier, Pleisthenes, to the captive (and effectively orphaned) son of the Armenian village headman whom he took home with him as his lover, treating him as the most faithful of companions (πιστοτάτῳ ἐχρήτο);<sup>42</sup> or the valour displayed by Episthenes, to whom reference has already been made, in association with his band of beautiful youths.

The most notable and extended of Xenophon's pederastic narratives is that of the affair between Arkhidamos, son of King Agesilaos of Sparta, and Kleonumos, son of Sphodrias. The sentiment that inspired it lasted for at least seven years, from Sphodrias' luckless raid on Attica (378 B.C.) to the death of Kleonumos defending his king on the field of Leuktra in 371 B.C. The liaison between two such eminent families must have been a very public affair. According to Xenophon, it gave rise to a disreputable deal arranged by Arkhidamos with his father, on behalf of Sphodrias, his παιδικά's father, whereby Sphodrias was acquitted (quite wrongfully in Xenophon's view) of treason. But the relationship between the two young men seems to have been an honourable one. Xenophon says of Kleonumos that he declared that he would

<sup>36</sup> *Mem.* 2.1.32.

<sup>37</sup> Plato, *Symposium* 217–19. Dover (n. 2), p. 160. Cf. Guthrie (n. 29), pp. 70–8.

<sup>38</sup> *Anab.* 3.4.46–9, 4.4.12–13.

<sup>39</sup> *Mem.* 3.5.15. Cf. Cantarella (n. 3), p. 64. But the evidence suggests to me that Xenophon's attitude to boy-love was far more complex than Cantarella allows.

<sup>40</sup> See above pp. 77f. and n. 18.

<sup>41</sup> *Hell.* 4.8.38–9.

<sup>42</sup> *Anab.* 4.6.1–3.

never besmirch Arkhidamos' honour, and that 'while he lived, all his actions were those of a good and noble Spartan. His death caused Arkhidamos terrible pain; but he had kept his promise; he had brought him honour and not shame.'<sup>43</sup>

We can only guess at what complexities lie behind the brief narrative of Agesilaos' relationship with the son of the Persian satrap Pharnabazos and Parapita. *ξενία* was established between them, and Agesilaos seems to have followed the young man's career. Later, the king used his influence to get the Persian's Athenian *παιδικά* admitted to the boy's race at Olympia.<sup>44</sup> The *ξενία* pact may have had political significance, but the pendent anecdote of the Athenian *παιδικά* seems to owe its place to the favourable light which, in Xenophon's view, it sheds on Agesilaos' loyalty to his friends.

The evidence so far shows a number of love relationships between men which seem to meet with Xenophon's approval. The historian is no tabloid reporter, hot in the pursuit of titillating details, but it would be surprising if these relationships had not found physical expression. Such liaisons (short of anal penetration, which is implicitly condemned at *Mem.* 2.1.30<sup>45</sup>) do not attract condemnation on Xenophon's part unless they involve actual or risked betrayals of trust. Indeed, there is some slight evidence to support the speculation that (as might be expected of an Athenian of his background) Xenophon himself had found a male lover during his campaigning in Asia Minor. Xenophon's response to Kritoboulos' kiss (discussed below) as well as his obvious interest in retailing love-stories about *παιδικά* suggest that he had an eye for a handsome youth, and a passage in the *Anabasis* shows that soldiers might be expected to take their boys or women along with them. For when it was decided that the baggage train must be reduced by leaving behind recently taken prisoners of war, a blind eye might be turned if a soldier was in love with a good-looking boy or woman. At a later point, in defending his exercise of authority, Xenophon includes the claim that he never quarrelled with a soldier over his *παιδικά*.<sup>46</sup> While the sentence does not assert that Xenophon had a *παιδικά*, it clearly implies that it would have caused no surprise had there been such a boy for whom he might have been expected to fight. It may also be noted (though the point is not so relevant to the discussion in Greek eyes as in ours) that Xenophon was probably not yet married at the time, and might well be expected to have sought the comfort of a male lover as did some of his companions on the Long March.<sup>47</sup>

It is against this background that we must question the role of the 'boy' (*παῖς*) whom Xenophon brought with him to the court of Seuthes.<sup>48</sup> The existence of this young man is known because of Xenophon's embarrassment at having no suitable gift for Seuthes, his host. He had, he records, brought nothing with him from Parion except his *παῖς* and a few provisions. Unfortunately the ambiguity of the term here can

<sup>43</sup> *Hell.* 5.4.25–33 and 6.4.13f. The translation cited is that of Warner. The liaison can be considered independently of the role it may have played in securing Sphodrias' acquittal. The exact age of the lovers is not known. Xenophon describes Kleonumos as just out of puberty at the time of the Sphodrias affair (378 B.C.). Paul Cartledge, in the Chronological Table of his *Agesilaos* (London, 1987), suggests that Arkhidamos may already have been born when Agesilaos ascended the throne in 400 B.C.

<sup>44</sup> *Hell.* 4.1.39. Cf. G. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 58f. On the diplomatic overtones of this story, cf. Cartledge (n. 43), p. 193.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Hindley (n. 1), p. 349.

<sup>46</sup> *Anab.* 4.1.12–14, 5.8.4.

<sup>47</sup> The circumstances of Xenophon's marriage are obscure. E. Delebecque (*Essai sur la Vie de Xénophon* [Paris, 1957], p. 124) dates it to 399 or 398; J. K. Anderson (*Xenophon* [London, 1974], p. 162) places it some time after 399 B.C.

<sup>48</sup> *Anab.* 7.3.20.

hardly be resolved. When later in the banquet another guest presents a 'παῖς', the meaning seems to be 'slave'. But Xenophon does not make a present of his 'boy' to Seuthes, and at *Lac. Pol.* 2.12–13, as at *Anab.* 4.1.14, he clearly treats παῖς as equivalent to παιδικά. Perhaps on active service the roles of slave, batman, lover, coalesced. The traces of pederastic interest in this record are too slight to yield a firm conclusion, but it is at least possible, and even likely, given the *mores* of the time, that Xenophon, in common with many of his men, had found a young male companion to share the rigours of campaigning.<sup>49</sup>

But the *Memorabilia* provides clearer evidence of Xenophon's acceptance of love relationships between men, and his divergence from Sokrates' views on their means of expression. I refer to the episode of Kritoboulos' kiss.<sup>50</sup> Sokrates, it will be remembered, came to know that Kritoboulos had kissed Alkibiades' handsome son. The discovery prompts the philosopher to utter an uncompromising warning (though cast in humorous vein) about the dangers of such conduct. It is worse, he says, than the bite of a poisonous spider, rendering the victim a slave to his passions, and even driving him to madness. The humour is characteristic of Xenophon's (and, often, Sokrates') relaxed and informal style in dealing with serious matters.<sup>51</sup> But the thought is in line with Sokrates' utterances on self-control, and his ban on homosexual copulation,<sup>52</sup> to which (it is implied) the first kiss will inevitably lead. Much more interesting is Xenophon's own contribution to the discussion.

This conversation is the only occasion in the *Memorabilia* at which Xenophon claims to have been present not merely as a reporter but as a participant. It is introduced by reference to Sokrates' teaching (already noted) that one should resolutely abstain from sex with beautiful youths.<sup>53</sup> But the effect of Xenophon's contribution is to dissociate him from Sokrates' rigorist views. For when Sokrates suggests that Kritoboulos, by his rash act, has belied his character as a sober and prudent man and become instead foolish and reckless (ἀνόητος καὶ ῥυφοκίνδυνος), Xenophon replies, that he might well take a similar risk himself. The historian, it seems, shares with his male contemporaries that susceptibility to ephebic beauty which Sokrates warns against.<sup>54</sup> In the face of Sokrates' comparison with the fateful spider's bite, he protests the innocuous character of the lover's kiss. Indeed, his attitude is not so very far from Kritoboulos' light-hearted approach to kissing in a subsequent exchange with Sokrates.<sup>55</sup> It also accords with the evidence already assembled for Xenophon's positive attitude to male love.

<sup>49</sup> In the light of this conclusion we may look with fresh eyes on the incident of the trumpeter Silanos (*Anab.* 7.4.116). Doubtless he struck fear into the enemy with his trumpeting. But why is this minor figure given such prominence—even to the mention of his age, when, at eighteen, he was pre-eminently ὥρατος? Is this another young man who caught Xenophon's eye?

<sup>50</sup> *Mem.* 1.3.8–15.

<sup>51</sup> Vivienne Gray draws attention to this characteristic of Xenophon's style, both in his historical writing and his more philosophical works. (V. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* [London, 1989], pp. 76f. Cf. O. Gigon, *Kommentar zum ersten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien*, Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, Heft 5 [Basel, 1953], p. 110). Further examples of Xenophon's sense of humour are collected in S. E. Bassett, 'Wit and humor in Xenophon', *Classical Journal* 12 (1917), 565–574.

<sup>52</sup> See pp. 79–80 above and n. 37.

<sup>53</sup> *Mem.* 1.3.8. Cf. above p. 79 and n. 34.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *Sympos.* 4.25 where (of a kiss) Sokrates says, οὐ ἔρωτος οὐδὲν ἐστὶ δεινότερον ὑπέκκλιμα. The incident of Sokrates nudging Kritoboulos, reported by Kharmides at *Sympos.* 4.27, suggests that Sokrates shares the susceptibility, but still he warns against it: the encounter with Kritoboulos, he says, was like a wild beast's bite and gave him a sore shoulder for a week.

<sup>55</sup> *Mem.* 2.6.32.

Against this background, how are we to interpret the conclusion to the episode? Following Sokrates' advice to Kritoboulos to go away for a year, Xenophon continues with a summary of Sokrates' teaching on sexual matters which departs significantly from the advocacy of total abstinence found in *Mem.* 1.3.8:

οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀφροδισιάζειν τοὺς μὴ ἀσφαλῶς ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀφροδίσια ὥστε χρήναι τοιαῦτα, οἷα μὴ πάνν μὲν δεομένου τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἂν προσδέξαιτο ἢ ψυχῇ, δεομένου δὲ οὐκ ἂν πράγματα παρέχοι.<sup>56</sup>

The passage (whose grammatical construction is tortuous) seems intended to allow a concession to human weakness similar to that developed in regard to the dangers of overindulgence in food and drink (*Mem.* 1.3.6). Sokrates is represented as teaching that those who have difficulty in controlling their sexual drive may indulge when two conditions are fulfilled: (a) when the bodily urge is overpowering,<sup>57</sup> (b) when to indulge would cause no trouble. To illuminate the latter phrase (οὐκ ἂν πράγματα παρέχοι) Gigon refers to the avoidance of the risks of adultery recognized elsewhere in the *Memorabilia* (2.1.5), and finds parallels to the abstinence from sexual indulgence among anecdotes told of the philosophers by Diogenes Laertius and others.<sup>58</sup> They all concern the charms of women, and Gigon accordingly argues that §14 is concerned with heterosexual relationships. If so, the transition is abrupt, and it seems more likely that the section either continues the homosexual theme or covers both homosexual and heterosexual ἔρως, following the Greek tendency to minimize the difference between the two where τὰ ἀφροδίσια is concerned.<sup>59</sup> In either case, the phrase 'not causing trouble' could readily be interpreted by reference to *Memorabilia* 2.6.22, where self-control in sexual matters is urged in order to avoid hurting those who should not be hurt (see below, pp. 85f.).

But whether the section continues the homosexual theme of the conversation about Kritoboulos or moves to heterosexual (and presumably extra-marital) relationships, it is difficult to understand the link with its context seemingly conveyed by the words οὕτω δὴ. Οὕτω commonly refers to what precedes, and must surely do so here. If δὴ is then taken as emphatic,<sup>60</sup> it serves only to emphasize the disjunction with what has gone before. 'In this way' is precisely what the following words fail to show; for they allow occasional indulgence which Sokrates has just warned against. Only by a perversely excessive reliance on irony could one argue that 'in this way' means 'as urged upon Xenophon'—i.e. not at all. More probably, οὕτω δὴ is connective.<sup>61</sup> But even on this view, the point of comparison between the warning to Xenophon and the

<sup>56</sup> *Mem.* 1.3.14. The text is that of E. C. Marchant's second edition (*OCT*, 1921), omitting πρὸς before τοιαῦτα.

In essentials following Marchant, I would translate: 'In this way, then, he thought that those who find their sexual impulses difficult to control should engage sexually <only> in such activities as the mind would not condone unless an urgent bodily need arose, and such as, once the need was there, would not cause trouble.'

The phrase, πάνν δεομένου τοῦ σώματος, seems to conflate two thoughts: a definition of the kind of activity (that which arises from the body's need) and the timing (when that need becomes urgent (πάνν) for actions which otherwise the mind would not condone).

<sup>57</sup> For δέομαι with reference to the sexual urge, cf. *Mem.* 2.1.30, *Sympos.* 4.38, 4.15, *Hiero* 1.33.

<sup>58</sup> Gigon (n. 51), p. 117.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Dover (n. 2), pp. 63–5.

<sup>60</sup> J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (2nd edn, rev. K. J. Dover, Oxford, 1950; repr. Bristol, 1996), p. 209, § (x).

<sup>61</sup> Under this heading, Denniston alludes to the commonness of such openings to sentences as οὕτω δὴ, ἐνταῦθα δὴ (ibid., p. 236).



advice to those who 'find their sexual impulses difficult to control'<sup>62</sup> remains obscure. It may base itself on the distinction between desire which is inflamed by the flirtatious kiss (to be avoided) and bodily need which arises without such encouragement. Only in the latter case, when the desire becomes irresistible, may the mind (*ψυχή*) condone its physical expression. But such a view, intelligible in itself, is difficult to reconcile with the fact that in *Memorabilia* 1.3.8, and even more forcibly in the long exhortation to Kallias in *Symposium* 8, Sokrates unconditionally rules out any form of bodily love in relations with boys.

This discrepancy (coupled with the absence of any evidence for dislocation in the transmission of the text) suggests the hypothesis that Xenophon has here grafted in a statement by Sokrates from another (possibly heterosexual) context, in order to support the caveat that he had himself entered in condoning Kritoboulos' kiss.<sup>63</sup> Of course, the limited character of the concession allowed in *Memorabilia* 1.3.14 falls short of the positive view of homosexual *ἔρως* which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Kritoboulos in the *Symposium*. But it goes some way to soften the stark contrast between Sokrates' teaching on celibacy and (if the argument of this essay so far is correct) Xenophon's own attitude to pederasty.

One other point to arise from this passage is the role given to *ψυχή*, which Tredennick and Waterfield here and elsewhere translate as 'mind'. In this text, as in an earlier discussion of dietary self-discipline,<sup>64</sup> the decision on what is allowable or not rests with the *ψυχή*. There is also the recurrent contrast between love of body and love of *ψυχή*. The latter term had already by the time of Xenophon developed a complex history, and its significance in relation to Sokratic thought is discussed by Guthrie.<sup>65</sup> Of Xenophon's usage, one may say that, while the notion of the 'invisible part of man' is not excluded,<sup>66</sup> the *ψυχή* is thought of largely in functional terms: it is the seat of intelligence, judgement, thought, that which 'rules' in us, the organ of virtue or vice.<sup>67</sup> When Sokrates is said to 'love the soul', what he loves are not insubstantial wraiths, but people whose minds dispose them to virtue—*τῶν τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐ πεφυκότων ἐφιέμενος*.<sup>68</sup> The *ψυχή* is that which orders a person's life as a whole, and it may cover both the directing mind and the personality which results. It is for the *ψυχή* to judge (amongst other things) how far bodily desire for boys may be accepted. While for Sokrates the answer may be 'never', the analysis allows others such as Xenophon to respect a *ψυχή* which judges otherwise.<sup>69</sup> In the latter case the contrast between love of body and love of soul may well consist, not in a simple dichotomy between a physical and a non-physical love, but between a desire which is exclusively physical, and a love directed by the mind (*ψυχή*) which embraces both friendship and its physical expression.

<sup>62</sup> One might also ask whether this phrase implies that there is another class of men (and the whole discussion is carried on from a male perspective)—*οἱ ἀσφαλῶς ἔχοντες πρὸς ἀφροδίσια*? If so, are they totally abstinent (at least outside marriage), or are they men who, in the phrase attributed to Aristippos, are able to master pleasures without abstaining from them? (See n. 29 above.)

<sup>63</sup> One may compare the concession to overmastering desire acknowledged in Plato, *Phaedrus* 256. <sup>64</sup> *Mem.* 1.2.4. <sup>65</sup> Guthrie (n. 29), pp. 147–64.

<sup>66</sup> *Mem.* 1.4.9, 3.10.3, 4.3.14, 1.2.53; *Cyrop.* 8.7.17.

<sup>67</sup> *Mem.* 1.2.53, 1.4.13, 1.4.17 (in this section, *νοῦς* and *ψυχή* are equivalent), 4.3.14, 3.11.10. For *ψυχή* as the seat of virtue, see *Mem.* 1.2.19, 1.2.23, 2.6.30, 4.1.2, 4.8.1.

<sup>68</sup> *Mem.* 4.1.2. Conversely, it is possible to be *μοχθηρὸς τὴν ψυχήν*: cf. *Oecon.* 6.16.

<sup>69</sup> This is essentially the principle of self-regulation which Foucault develops under the heading 'Chréisis' (n. 2, part 1, ch. 2), though it was no doubt exercised within an overall understanding of custom and law (*νόμος*).

To sum up, the passage (*Mem.* 1.3.8–15) as a whole shows that

- (a) Xenophon acknowledges homosexual desire in himself (a not surprising fact, but a not unimportant one either).
- (b) he challenges Sokrates' rigorist view on grounds of common sense.
- (c) he acknowledges circumstances (though circumscribed) in which the physical expression of sex with boys may be accepted by the mind without harmful consequences. It is for the individual *ψυχή* to regulate these matters.
- (d) while Sokrates' practice of abstinence is to be admired, it may be questioned whether this rule is to be made universal, since even the master allowed some relaxation.

The division over sexual ethics between Sokrates and Xenophon which we see emerging is dramatized here and elsewhere around the character of Kritoboulos. He is presented, not as the porcine (and potentially tyrannical) Kritias, but as one who is (to the average observer) *σωφρονικός* and *προνοητικός*.<sup>70</sup> Despite Sokrates' rebuke over his delight in kissing a charming ephebe, he can later in the *Memorabilia* engage in a serious discussion with the philosopher about civic virtue and friendship. He is also Sokrates' interlocutor for the first six chapters of the *Oeconomicus*, where he responsibly explores with the philosopher questions of business and estate management. In both dialogues Kritoboulos shows himself for the most part a willing pupil of Sokrates. The one point at which he seems to resist Sokrates' teaching is over his associations with young men. In *Memorabilia* 2.6.32 the jovial banter about kissing beautiful ephebes is repeated, with no sign of recantation on Kritoboulos' part, despite Sokrates' attempts to move him away from assuming that one can catch the physically beautiful and the morally virtuous in the same net of friendship. And in the *Oeconomicus* (where Kritoboulos is depicted as already married) Sokrates chides him as one *παιδικοῖς πράγμασι προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν*.<sup>71</sup> It should, however, be noted that for Sokrates the ground of criticism is the waste of time and money involved in pederasty, rather than, in our sense, the 'immorality' of such activities. As for Kritoboulos himself, he claims, after listening to Sokrates' advocacy of *ἐγκράτεια*, to have attained reasonable success in applying this teaching to his personal life.<sup>72</sup>

The general picture of Kritoboulos as a lover of young men seems to justify us in taking the masculine genders in the Kritoboulos texts mentioned as referring to beautiful men rather than beautiful people in general. More doubt attaches to one remaining passage, where the following words, attributed to Sokrates, are embedded in a discussion between Sokrates and Kritoboulos, and relate to the *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* who develop friendship to put a brake on their mutual animosities and conflicting ambitions:

διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν αἰροῦνται μὲν ἄνευ πόνου τὰ μέτρια κεκτηῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ πολέμου πάντων κυριεύειν, καὶ δύνανται πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες ἀλύπως σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κοινωνεῖν καὶ τοῖς τῶν ὡραίων ἀφροδισίοις ἡδόμενοι καρτερεῖν, ὥστε μὴ λυπεῖν οὓς μὴ προσήκει. (*Mem.* 2.6.22.)

<sup>70</sup> *Mem.* 1.3.9.

<sup>71</sup> *Oecon.* 2.7. Given the character of Kritoboulos as revealed elsewhere, *παιδικὰ πράγματα* must surely refer to the objects of *ἔρως*—'minions' (Marchant) rather than 'childish pursuits' (Waterfield). For Kritoboulos' marriage, see *Oecon.* 3.13 and *Sympos.* 2.3.

<sup>72</sup> *Oecon.* 2.1 αὐτὸς δ' ἑμαυτὸν ἐξετάζων δοκῶ μοι εὐρίσκειν ἐπιεικῶς τῶν τοιούτων ἐγκρατῆ ὄντα.

The surrounding conversation ranges across the field of friendship and how to conduct one's affairs decently, in a way which might seem to be consistent with an advocacy of sexual abstinence (outside marriage). But the reference to sex arises out of a variant of that overworked theme, control over bodily appetites, where the phrase *τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις ἡδόμενοι* indicates actual participation in sexual pleasure.<sup>73</sup> The point is, once again, self-restraint, not abstinence.<sup>74</sup> The immediate context is concerned with what the individual can fairly take (whether of food, drink, or sex), and what is 'fair' in regard to sexual pleasure is defined in the qualification, *ὥστε μὴ λυπεῖν οὐς μὴ προσήκει*. The passage would then mean 'exercise self-control in taking sexual pleasure with people in the bloom of youth, so as not to harm those whom one should not harm'. What is not clear, however, in this isolated mention of sexual relations, is the gender of the objects of desire. Does the good man avoid adultery (which would harm a husband's—and fellow citizen's—rights) and go for female prostitution instead (with equal concern, we would hope, for the woman involved)? Or does he cultivate his *παιδικά* with what would be regarded as an honourable love, which would bring no harm to the beloved? Perhaps both forms of sexual engagement are envisaged, though here again the occurrence of the phrases in a 'Kritoboulos context' suggests a preference for the male interpretation. Either way, the passage advocates a form of moderation and respect for others in indulging sexual desire which is akin to *Mem.* 1.3.14.<sup>75</sup>

Insofar as they include pederasty within their purview, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile either *Mem.* 1.3.14 or *Mem.* 2.6.22 as teachings of Sokrates, with the exhortation to abstain from pederastic sex attributed to him elsewhere. I have suggested that *Mem.* 1.3.14 may represent an attempt by Xenophon to moderate the teaching. On the other hand, when, in *Mem.* 2.6.22, the reference to *τὰ ἀφροδίσια* appears as tangential to the discussion of rivalry among the *καλοὶ κάγαθοί*, we may understand 'Sokrates' here to be reporting on observed social *mores* rather than formulating his own teaching.

As far as Kritoboulos is concerned, the consistent picture to emerge from the various passages so far discussed is that of a young man who combines a continuing, but (according to his own estimation) reasonably self-disciplined, love of pleasure, with a serious interest in philosophy and public affairs. He had, however, so far as we know, no public persona, nor any reputation as a philosopher. He might therefore be deemed to be merely a representative of views widely accepted in his social circle. But when the only personal intervention by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* (over Kritoboulos' kiss) so clearly aligns the historian with the latter, it is not unreasonable

<sup>73</sup> The wider context concerns the antidote to *πλεονεξία*—what one can properly take for oneself. The reference to *τὰ ἀφροδίσια* parallels the immediately preceding comment on moderate participation in food and drink, with *κοινωνεῖν* meaning 'take a share of' (LSJ), rather than 'give a share of' (as Marchant and Tredennick/Waterfield). The latter, as part of a more general mutual assistance (*ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις*) only arises in §23, while §22 concerns the familiar theme of moderation in food and drink, and self-control in matters of sex. Cf. *Mem.* 1.3.14.

<sup>74</sup> *καρτερεῖν* flows from *ἐγκράτεια*, but does not require the renunciation of pleasure. Cf. the collocation of *ἐγκράτεια-καρτερεῖν-ἡδεσθαι* at *Mem.* 4.5.9.

<sup>75</sup> The theme of self-discipline over bodily appetites is set at the head of the whole chapter (*Mem.* 2.6.1). Gigon finds it alien to the subject of contention between good men (O. Gigon, *Kommentar zum zweiten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien*, *Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft*, Heft 7 [Basel, 1956], pp. 146f.). But current views on the risk of pederasty infringing citizen status throw new light on this contention. In regard to pederasty, at least, the moderation advocated in this text may have an important bearing on the mutual adjustments between good men in society.

to assume that on questions of pederasty, Xenophon is closer to Kritoboulos than to Sokrates. It would follow that in seeking Xenophon's views we should give more attention than has been customary to Kritoboulos' speech in the *Symposium*, a speech which occupies a position in Xenophon's dialogue somewhat similar to that of Pausanias in the *Symposium* of Plato.<sup>76</sup>

It will be recalled that the topic for discussion, introduced by Kallias, is the quality upon which each speaker particularly prides himself. For Kritoboulos, this is his beauty. With a bantering irony to match that of the other speakers, he claims that it is through this quality that he can get what he requires from others without lifting a finger. Kritoboulos infers this conclusion from the assumption that other people's attitudes to him, as a handsome man (and putative ἐρώμενος) will mirror his own reaction to the beauty of his παιδικά, Kleinias. Following a passionate opening declaration of his love for Kleinias, the central portion of Kritoboulos' speech consists of a sequence of three-pointed sections on the blessings which accrue from beauty:

1. For the παιδικά it gives more reason for boasting than strength/bravery/wisdom.
2. It provides him with money/personal (even menial and laborious) service/protection from danger.
3. The ἐραστής is 'inspired' with corresponding virtues: to be liberal with money/to endure toil/to court glory through danger.

Thus far section 3 balances section 2, the virtues inspired in the ἐραστής corresponding to the services he performs for the ἐρώμενος. Moreover, the thought so far can be illustrated from elsewhere: lavish expenditure on the παιδικά is reported in other authors;<sup>77</sup> the lover's 'enslavement' to the beloved and love's power to inspire the lover to heroism on the battlefield are found in Plato's *Symposium*, in the speeches of Pausanias<sup>78</sup> and Phaidros<sup>79</sup> respectively. We need not decide whether here (and in *Symposium* 8.32) Xenophon was echoing or misquoting Plato, or whether, possibly, both were drawing on a more widely current discourse of love.<sup>80</sup> But for an analysis of Xenophon's own views, it is significant that the list of qualities in section 3 is extended (καὶ μὴν<sup>81</sup>) to less commonplace ideas. 'Ερώμενοι, says Kritoboulos, also inspire their ἐρασταί (to be:

αἰδημονέστεροι,  
ἐγκρατέστεροι,  
οἳ γὰρ καὶ ὦν δέονται μάλιστα ταῦτ' αἰσχύνονται.

<sup>76</sup> Xenophon, *Sympos.* 4.10–18. Cf. Plato, *Sympos.* 180c ff. One cannot go quite so far as to say that Kritoboulos is simply Xenophon's mouthpiece, if only because the former's pleasure in spending money on his παιδικά would clearly attract Xenophon's censure (*Mem.* 1.2.22).

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Plato, *Symposium* 184a, 185a; Aristophanes, *Wealth* 153–9; Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.2.22; *Anab.* 2.6.6. Cf. Dover (n. 2), pp. 92f., 107. Such expenditure is criticized by Xenophon, but for Aristotle a proper degree of liberality with money is a virtue (*Nic. Eth.* 4.1, 1119b24ff.).

<sup>78</sup> Plato, *Symposium* 183a, 184b. φιλοπονώτερος corresponds to the more explicit 'serving as Kleinias' slave' in §14. Enslavement to the παιδικά is condemned by Sokrates while it is condoned, if not praised, by Plato's Pausanias.

<sup>79</sup> Plato, *Symposium* 178d–179b. The principle that the lover may be inspired to valour by the presence of his beloved is accepted by Xenophon at *Cynegeticus* 12.20, though rejected by Sokrates at *Sympos.* 8.32ff.

<sup>80</sup> On the complex problems surrounding the relationship between the two dialogues on this subject, see K. J. Dover, 'The date of Plato's *Symposium*', *Phronesis* 10 (1965), reprinted in K. J. Dover, *The Greeks and their Legacy* (Oxford, 1988).

With this conclusion, the somewhat light-hearted tone of the first part of Kritoboulos' contribution has been dispelled, the point of transition being marked by Kritoboulos' claim that he is better able than Kritias to inspire every kind of virtue. In particular, the introduction of quite new elements, including a reference to the important virtue of *ἐγκράτεια*, requires to be taken seriously.

*αἰδήμων*, the word used of disciplined Spartan boys at *Lac. Pol.* 2.10 and of the young Kuros in his respect for the elders (*Anab.* 1.9.5), seems at odds with Kritoboulos' flamboyant spending as criticized by Sokrates in *Oec.* 2.5–7. *ἐγκρατής*, referring to the virtue which Xenophon seems sometimes to set above all others, is only doubtfully to be applied to the Kritoboulos of the dialogues. But of course the question at issue is not the nature of an historical character, but the ethical conclusion that Xenophon wishes to reach. It is embodied above all in the last three virtues, and, in particular, in the concluding statement on *αἰσχύνη*. The beauty of the *ἐρώμενος* will make the *ἐραστής* modest and self-controlled and the latter will show *αἰσχύνη* towards those things he most needs. The circumlocution shows a characteristic reticence in mentioning sex when it is the subject of approval rather than condemnation.<sup>82</sup> But in the context of a discourse on love, the concept of 'need' is surely to be aligned with *Hiero* 1.33, *Mem.* 1.3.14, and similar passages—the body's need for sex.

But does the *ἐραστής* show 'shame'—and so not seek bodily consummation of his love, or 'reverence'—approaching *τὰ ἀφροδίδια* with the respect accorded to one he loves? Von Erffa has shown how in the course of development from Homer onwards, *αἰσχύνομαι* came, in some instances, to shed its association with shame, and how (particularly in Thoukudides) it may mean to 'show honour or respect'.<sup>83</sup> In Xenophon, *αἰσχύνομαι* generally refers to shame. In some instances it is ambiguous. But there are clear instances where it means 'show respect for' or 'diffidence towards'. Closest to the context of Kritoboulos' speech is the Median gentleman, who hesitates to approach Kuros for a kiss out of respect for the young prince. There is the general, Proxenos, who shows more deference to his troops than they do to him, and the Thracian, Medosades, who shows no proper respect to the gods or to his ally. Kuros' arrangements for quartering his troops were designed to develop mutual respect among them, and later in the *Cyropaedia* *ἐκείνους αἰσχυντρέον* refers to troops who have borne the heat of battle.<sup>84</sup> These instances lend substantial support to the Tredennick/Waterfield translation of *Symposium* 4.15: 'because they (the lovers) feel reverence for what they most desire'.

The decisive point is the structure of the argument: it is difficult to believe, in the light not only of this speech but of the pervasive divergence between Kritoboulos and Sokrates over sexual *mores*, that the younger man's eulogy of *ἔρω* should reach its climax in a recommendation of abstinence. But it would be natural for Xenophon, in constructing Kritoboulos' speech, to move from what the scanty evidence suggests may have been a recognized discourse of love to thoughts more distinctively his own about self-control and respect. And it is consonant with all we have so far gleaned

<sup>81</sup> *καὶ μὲν* as 'progressive', introducing a new point: see Denniston (n. 60), pp. 351f.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. the avoidance of the term *τὰ αἰδοῖα* at *Hiero* 1.4–5, and, for general usage, Dover (n. 2), pp. 53f. Also, on this passage, see Foucault (n. 2), p. 223: 'the "thing" is designated by the very impossibility of naming it'.

<sup>83</sup> C. E. von Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ und verwandte Begriffe in ihrer Entwicklung von Homer bis Demokrit*, *Philologus Supplementband* 30, Heft 2 (1937).

<sup>84</sup> *Cyrop.* 1.4.27; *Anab.* 2.6.19 (cf. Kharmides' diffidence before the 'lower orders' of the *ekklesia*—*Mem.* 3.7.6); *Anab.* 7.7.9 (cf. *Anab.* 2.5.39); *Cyrop.* 2.1.25, 4.2.40. Cf. also Aiskhines 1.180.

about Xenophon's attitudes (and his self-acknowledged sympathy for Kritoboulos) that he might use the speech to express a view midway between Sokrates' advocacy of celibacy (so far as boys are concerned) and the profligacy of those who (like Kritias) are devoted to nothing but their own physical pleasure. For Xenophon, with his emphasis on *ἐγκράτεια*, would condemn the latter as much as would Sokrates. Instead, he advocates a temperate course, in which the self-disciplined man can nonetheless enjoy a positive *ἔρως*, and in which physical consummation is tempered with respect for the beloved, soul and body.<sup>85</sup>

This blend of the physical and the ethical may also provide an underlying logic for the transition to the conclusion of the speech proper: it justifies the well-known principle that the presence of a lover can inspire men to deeds of honour (and so it is foolish, says Kritoboulos, to ignore this factor in appointing generals). A similar conjunction of the dimensions of physical and personal relationships allows society to recognize different forms of 'beauty' as a man grows from childhood to old age.<sup>86</sup>

Reticence over these matters, as Dover has emphasized, inhibits explicit statements of what such physical relationships involve, though Aiskhulos comes close to it when he makes Akhilles speak of his reverence for the thighs of Patroklos.<sup>87</sup> But the concept of honourable love which includes the physical and to which the climax of Kritoboulos' speech points, finds support in the phraseology used by other writers: the *δίκαιος ἔρως* or *τὸ ἀδιαφθόρως ἐρᾶσθαι* of Aiskhines; the love of Ouranian Aphrodite advocated by Plato's Pausanias, which is *ὑβρεως ἀμοίρος* and which is to be practised *κοσμίως γε καὶ νομίμως*; the decency with which the speaker in *Lusias 3* claims to have treated the youth Theodotos. From Xenophon himself we may recall the description of Kallias' love for Autolukos as *σώφρων ἔρως*, or Pleisthenes' treatment of his Armenian *παιδικά*. In dealing with a culture so different from our own it is difficult to be confident about how far allowance must be made for things obscure to us which the Greeks would have taken for granted. But closer analysis supports the view that a physical relationship is implicit in all these examples.<sup>88</sup>

The fullest exposition of the combination of respect for the beloved with physical love-making is that attributed by Xenophon to Hieron, tyrant of Syracuse. I have already suggested that Kritoboulos may to some extent be regarded as reflecting Xenophon's views. With even more confidence can this be said of Hieron, who was tyrant of Syracuse before Xenophon was born. What Xenophon gives us is an imaginary dialogue, and it is likely that one reason, at least, for the choice of Hieron and Simonides (rather than Sokrates) as protagonists is the fact that the views expressed were not those of the philosopher. That is particularly true in relation to the subject of this article. Moreover, while (as Professor Gray has argued) Simonides is

<sup>85</sup> It may well be that adherence to such a view (and the observations that led him to it) underlie Xenophon's sympathy with reported scepticism about the Spartans' observance of the *νόμος* of Lukourgos which enjoined celibacy in regard to boys—*Lac. Pol.* 2.14.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.5.11 (1361b), and the same author's recognition of the transition, which may (though not invariably) occur with the passing of time, from *ἔρως* to *φιλία* in a relationship, *Nic. Eth.* 8.4.1–2 (1157a).

<sup>87</sup> Aiskhulos, frs. 135, 136 (*TrGF*). Cf. Dover (n. 2), pp. 197f.

<sup>88</sup> Aiskhines 1.136–7; Plato, *Symposium* 181c, 182a5 (cf. 184d4); *Lusias 3.5*; Xenophon, *Sympos.* 1.10, *Anab.* 4.6.1–3. Dover (n. 2, pp. 42ff.) takes Aiskhines' *δίκαιος ἔρως* as the text for his analysis of the degree of physical intimacy permitted. See also K. J. Dover, *Plato: Symposium* (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 95f. (Pausanias); C. Hindley, 'Law, society and homosexuality in Classical Athens (Comment)', *Past & Present* 133 (1991), p. 172 (Pausanias and *Lusias 3*); above, pp. 76f. (Autolukos). Also cf. Winkler's discussion of the distinction between approved pederasty and the life of the *κίανιδος* (n. 23, pp. 53f.).

cast in the role of 'Wise Man', in the first part of the dialogue, the author's sympathies are clearly with Hieron, who wins the first exchanges.<sup>89</sup>

One could wish that the relative dating of Xenophon's works was more firmly established, but it is widely thought that the *Hiero* is a comparatively late work, and the probability is that it was written after the *Symposium*.<sup>90</sup> If so, one could well argue that its brief discussion of pederasty represents a development of aspects of the Xenophontic thought earlier expressed in the Kritoboulos speech. This relative dating also seems (as I argue below) to provide a plausible explanation for the relationship between the theories of *ἔρως* attributed respectively to Sokrates and to Hieron.

The brief discussion in the *Hiero* begins by placing sex alongside the other bodily appetites, and Simonides asserts that the prospect of enjoying τὰ ἀφροδίσια may well be what motivates a man to seek absolute power. After an analysis of this thought in respect of marriage, the discussion moves to sex with boys. But Hieron makes it immediately clear that he is not interested in 'mere' sex, which is no more than the satisfaction of physical appetite. He wants τὰ μετ' ἔρωτος ἀφροδίσια, which (as 'everyone knows') yields immeasurably greater pleasure. The need for *ἔρως* (in the sense of passionate desire for another) is a variant of the general argument that sensual pleasure is keenest where it is stimulated by desire (such as hunger or thirst) for something not immediately available. This psychological perception creates special difficulty for the tyrant, who need never be in want. He has the power to force his will upon an unwilling boy, but in so doing he will inhibit the pleasure he most desires. For while his body 'needs' what Dailochos can give him, he also wants it to be freely given—μετὰ φιλίας καὶ παρὰ βουλομένου. The reference to 'need' links this passage with the Kritoboulos speech (ὦν δέονται),<sup>91</sup> as does the attitude which Hieron recognizes he must adopt. He will not seek pleasure by force (a kind of robbery), but will seek only such favours as the παιδικά freely wills to give. This is to exercise that respect for his lover which Kritoboulos commends. It manifests the attitude previously noted in the *Memorabilia*, where the self-controlled lover will avoid hurting (or grieving) the beloved.<sup>92</sup> More generally, as Sokrates elsewhere argues in regard to the senses, ἐγκράτεια not ἀκρασία actually brings the greater pleasure.<sup>93</sup>

It is along these lines that Xenophon reconciles the need for self-control and the desire for sexual gratification. And the pleasure associated with the latter is suggested by the words ἡδύς, ἡδομαι. Of course these words are used very widely, often in a quite weak sense, 'pleasant'. But in some instances the context clearly requires at least an

<sup>89</sup> Cf. V. J. Gray, 'Xenophon's *Hiero* and the meeting of the Wise Man and Tyrant in Greek literature', *CQ* 36 (1986), 115–123 at 117. G. J. D. Aalders, 'Date and intention of Xenophon's *Hiero*', *Mnemosyne*, 4th ser. 6 (1953), 213f.

Pederasty is the subject of *Hiero* 1.29–38.

<sup>90</sup> According to Dover (n. 80), Xenophon's *Symposium* was written after the formation of the Sacred Band at Thebes in 378, and Plato's work of the same title, before that date. There also seems some force in the argument that the reference to Spartan leadership (Xenophon, *Sympos.* 8.39) implies a date before Leuktra (371): see reference to F. Dornseiff at Dover (n. 80), p. 97, n. 41. The arguments linking *Hiero* with political developments in Syracuse and political assassinations in the ruling house at Phrae seem persuasive, yielding, according to Hatzfeld, a date of 360–355. See Jean Hatzfeld, 'Note sur la date et l'objet du *Hiéron* de Xénophon', *REG* 59 (1946), 54–70; also Delebecque (n. 47), who dates *Hiero* to 358–357.

<sup>91</sup> *Sympos.* 4.15.

<sup>92</sup> *Mem.* 2.6.22. This is important evidence for the Greek recognition of a distinction between hubristic and hubris-free sexual relations (though the word ὕβρις is not used). On ὕβρις in the sphere of sexual activity generally, see N. R. E. Fisher, *Hybris* (Warminster, 1992).

<sup>93</sup> *Mem.* 4.5.9.

awareness that the gratification has a sexual basis.<sup>94</sup> So here, when Hieron speaks of ἔρως being required for τὰ ἡδίστα ἀφροδίσια, the repeated use of ἡδίστος subsequently to describe the παιδικά's response by word and gesture<sup>95</sup> indicates the erotic content of such flirtatious behaviour.

But if my interpretations of the *Hiero* and the Kritoboulos passages are correct, it becomes clear that broadly three approaches to the love of boys appear in Xenophon's writings. First is the more or less amoral concentration on physical gratification—whether enthusiastically pursued (as in the case of Kritias) or regarded as an irritant to be relieved as expeditiously as possible (as with Antisthenes or the concessionary indulgence recognized at *Memorabilia* 1.3.14). This is the sphere of τὰ ἀφροδίσια pure and simple. Then there is the 'way of moderation' (implicit in the attitudes of Kritoboulos and Hieron) which combines the love of body with affection and respect for the mind or personality (ψυχή). Finally, there is the 'Socratic' view, the 'way of celibacy', which concentrates on the love of the mind/personality and its development to the exclusion of genital activity, and which reaches its fullest expression (in Xenophon's writings) in chapter 8 of the *Symposium*. In the closing part of this paper I propose to explore the complex web of linguistic cross-references between crucial sections in the *Symposium* and the *Hiero* which suggests that Xenophon is aware of arguing (perhaps with himself as well as with his readers) the comparative merits of the latter two lifestyles. The passages concerned are *Symposium* 8.12–18 and *Hiero* 1.29–38.

In the *Symposium* Sokrates, while alluding to the Ouranian and Pandemian Aphrodite expounded by Plato's Pausanias,<sup>96</sup> sets up a far sharper distinction between love of body and love of mind/soul than is to be found in the latter. Basing himself on this distinction, Xenophon's Sokrates devotes paragraphs 12–18 to a eulogy of the love of mind, which expresses itself in φιλία. He has no time for the physical expression of same-sex love, which for him (§§19–22) is an ἀναιδής ὁμιλία, leading to πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόσια πεπραγμένα. The distinction and relative merits of the two loves are further expounded in what follows, but paragraphs 12–18 are sufficiently self-contained to provide a basis for comparison with Hieron's philosophy on the question whether or not to admit a physical relationship.

It is true that Xenophon's Sokrates, briefly and in passing, recognizes the possibility of combining love for mind with love for body,<sup>97</sup> but he immediately dismisses it in order to concentrate on the love which excludes the physical. The result is a gap in Sokrates' exposition where one might expect to find something like 'love' in our modern sense—a relationship which combines physical and ethical elements. We shall not, on the other hand, be surprised to find Hieron implicitly challenging the dichotomy propounded by Sokrates, following the declaration that in matters of good and evil, we sometimes experience pleasure and pain through the mind alone, and

<sup>94</sup> Cf. *Mem.* 2.6.22. One also recalls the Theban polemarchs entrapped by Phillidas with the expectation of a night with the most beautiful courtesans—μάλα ἡδέως προσεδέχοντο νυκτερεύειν (*Hell.* 5.4.5); or the comment in *Oecon.* 10.7 that the gods have ordained sexual attraction between members of the same species—καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀνθρώπου σῶμα καθαρὸν οἶονται ἡδίστον εἶναι. Cf. also Aristophanes, *Clouds* 1069, with J. Henderson's comments, *The Maculate Muse* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 158–9. ἡδύς appears as the description of lovers in erotic inscriptions of the fourth century on Thasos (LSJ, Revised Supplement, Oxford, 1996).

<sup>95</sup> *Hiero* 1.30 and 34–5. Cf. Kritoboulos' repeated use of ἡδιον to show how he places devotion to Kleinias above everything else (*Sympos.* 4.14–15).

<sup>96</sup> Plato, *Symposium* 180–1. On the chronological precedence of Plato's work, see above, n. 90.

<sup>97</sup> *Sympos.* 8.14: ἂν δὲ καὶ ἀμφοτέρα στέρξωσι...



sometimes jointly through mind and body.<sup>98</sup> Following this clue, one might well argue that the allusions to pederasty at various points in the *Hiero* seem precisely to fill the void apparent in the Sokratic treatment. For where 'Sokrates' argues for an exclusive attention to mind, Hieron presupposes a combination of mind and body.

Both discussions announce that they are concerned to promote enjoyment (εὐφραίνειν, εὐφραίνεσθαι) whether through ethical relationships (ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔρως) or through τὰ ἀφροδίσια.<sup>99</sup> For Sokrates, love of mind leads to φιλία, without which there can be no relationship worthy of the name. For Hieron it is sex based on desire (ἔρως) which brings enjoyment:

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἄνευ φιλίας συνουσία οὐδεμία ἀξιόλογος πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα  
(*Sympos.* 8.13)<sup>100</sup>

ὅτι <μὲν> γὰρ τὰ μετ' ἔρωτος ἀφροδίσια πολὺ διαφερόντως εὐφραίνει πάντες δὴ πού  
ἐπιστάμεθα (*Hiero* 1.29)

To take these two sentences in isolation, however (despite the significant degree of symmetry between them), would be to oversimplify the situation. Sokrates argues exclusively for φιλία. While it is true that for him φιλία stems from a form of ἔρως ('love of mind', §12), he seems uncomfortable with the latter term, which at §15 he replaces with ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φιλία. Hieron, on the other hand, having begun by contrasting τὰ μετ' ἔρωτος ἀφροδίσια with sexual gratification without love, goes on to posit a relationship of φιλία with the object of his desire. Indeed, his major aim in chapter 1 is to repudiate the idea that simple appeasement of the 'need' for sex is sufficient. He is inclusive (sex–desire–friendship) where Sokrates is exclusive (friendship only).

Both types of relationship are a form of compulsion (ἀνάγκη). For Sokrates, where love (φιλεῖν) is inspired by the beloved's character, it is an ἀνάγκη ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐθελουσία. For Hieron it is seemingly a compulsion of nature. For Sokrates this latter is to be resisted and replaced by the compulsion of φιλία. By contrast, Hieron's ideal is to combine an acceptance of the compulsion of sexual desire (and its attendant pleasures) with the values of friendship. These two foci of love are elegantly combined in Hieron's description of his relationship with Daïlochos.<sup>101</sup>

Both forms of relationship express φιλία and look for affection in return (ἀντι-φιλεῖσθαι) and both are celebrated in the exchange of glances and conversation.<sup>102</sup>

On the well-worn theme of appetite and satiety, Sokrates naturally argues that dependence on physical beauty (like the desire for food) is soon glutted and loses its appeal, whereas the love of the mind is ἀκορεστοτέρα (§§14, 15). But he neither admits that ἔρως (as desire for the unpossessed) may intensify pleasure, nor does he (in Xenophon's text) recognize the metaphysical dimension to this emotion which provides the starting point for Plato's philosophy of beauty. Hieron, on the other hand, accepting the comparison with the appetite for food and drink, finds an analogue in sexual matters in awaiting the free response of his παιδικά, which even a

<sup>98</sup> *Hiero* 1.5 (following Marchant's text of 1925 [Loeb]). The point is made by Simonides, but immediately accepted by Hieron.

<sup>99</sup> *Sympos.* 8.12, *Hiero* 1.29. On hedonism, see n. 29.

<sup>100</sup> συνουσία can mean sexual congress, but hardly in this context!

<sup>101</sup> *Sympos.* 8.13. *Hiero* 1.33: ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ ἐρῶ μὲν Δαϊλόχου ὧν περ ἴσως ἀναγκάζει ἡ φύσις ἀνθρώπου δεῖσθαι παρὰ τῶν καλῶν, τούτων δὲ ὧν ἐρῶ τυχεῖν, μετὰ μὲν φιλίας καὶ παρὰ βουλομένου πάνν ἰσχυρῶς ἐπιθυμῶ τυγχάνειν. Cf. p. 76 and n. 6 above.

<sup>102</sup> *Sympos.* 8.18, *Hiero* 1.35.

tyrant cannot command, but which is essential for his fulfilment—*παρὰ δὲ παιδικῶν βουλομένων ἥδιστα οἶμαι αἱ χάριτές εἰσιν*.

The key word *καλός* is also brought into the discussion. Sokrates uses it in its moral sense to describe the *έρώμενος* as *καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός*, and for him, the aim of the *ἐραστής* is not so much to enjoy the boy's beauty but to seek his well-being (*τὰ τοῦ παιδὸς καλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἡδέα σπουδάζοντα*, *Sympos.* 8.17). In the *Hiero*, however, the conventional use of *καλός* in erotic contexts is observed: Dailochos is *κάλλιστος* as the object of *έρᾶν*, and Hieron seeks what is needed *παρὰ τῶν καλῶν* (*Hiero* 1.31, 33).

If one takes in the Kritoboulos speech as part of the 'Xenophontic' view of *έρως*, two further linguistic parallels are notable. At *Symposium* 8.14, Sokrates refers to the common theme of the withering of youth's bloom. Rather surprisingly (and surely polemically) he draws the conclusion that it entails the withering, not merely of *έρως* but of *φιλία*, and the choice of the word *φιλία* here suggests that nothing of permanent value can come out of bodily love.<sup>103</sup> Kritoboulos, as spokesman for 'the way of moderation', has already anticipated this objection with his recognition that each stage of life has its own beauty (*Sympos.* 4.17). Kritoboulos also anticipates Sokrates by claiming the description *αἰδημονέστερος* for his type of lover (*Sympos.* 4.15, cf. 8.16).

Throughout these discussions Xenophon shows an awareness that the key words in a discourse of love can point in different directions, towards or away from an acceptance of the physical. But perhaps the most interesting link between the discussions in *Symposium* 8 and *Hiero* 1 is the word *ἐπαφρόδιτος*. At the simplest level, this provides just another verbal link between the two passages. But the meaning of the word presents a teasing problem. If it had originally had any connection with the sexual side of Aphrodite's domain, it had lost it by the time of the Byzantine lexicographers: the Suda gives 'charming' (*ἐπίχαρις*, *ἡδύς*). Photius applies it to the grace of literary style or as a translation of Sulla's agnomen, 'Felix'. A search of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* reveals (if we include one instance of the negative, *ἀνεπαφρόδιτος*) only nine occurrences in the fifth and fourth centuries, of which four are found in the Xenophon passages we are considering. Of the rest, Isokrates uses it to characterise the charm of Homer's style; Aiskhines recalls that Ktesiphon employed it in a fawning description of Philip; and the New Comedy poet, Philemon, incorporated it in a eulogy on the blessings of peace.<sup>104</sup> In all these cases something like 'charming' would seem an appropriate translation. There remain Herodotos, who twice uses the word in his story of the high-class courtesan, Rhodopis, and the four Xenophon instances.<sup>105</sup> In none of these latter passages would the translation 'charming' be impossible—but is it wholly satisfactory? When the adjective occurs in a sexual context, can we exclude

<sup>103</sup> A more balanced view is found in Aristotle, *Nic.Eth.* 1157a6–12. But see also the recognition in *Sympos.* 8.27 that the *ἐραστής* may convert his *παιδικά* into a good friend (*τῷ ὀρεγομένῳ ἐκ παιδικῶν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ποιήσασθαι*: the infinitive is seemingly a metaphorical use of *ποιεῖμαι* = 'beget').

<sup>104</sup> Isokrates, *Helen* 65.6; Aiskhines, *Fals.Leg.* 42.6 (also 52, where the description is glossed as *ὄψιν λαμπρός*); Philemon, *Frag.* 71. One should perhaps add a possible tenth instance which may be from the fourth century—the apparently undatable Lunkeus as cited in Athenaios, 6.242c, where the noun *ἐπαφροδίσια* refers to literary elegance. I am most grateful to Mrs Sue Willetts of the Library of the Institute of Classical Studies (London University) for technical guidance with TLG.

<sup>105</sup> Herodotos 2.135.2 and 135.5. Xenophon, *Sympos.* 8.15 (bis), 18; *Hiero* 1.35.

the influence of the cognates τὰ ἀφροδίσια and ἀφροδισιάζειν, or the substantial tradition of the appellative use of the name Aphrodite to mean sexual love?<sup>106</sup>

Herodotos describes how Rhodopis, who had lived as a slave in the same household on Samos as Aisopos, was brought to Egypt 'in the course of her trade' by one of her wealthy admirers, where she prospered greatly. According to Herodotos, κάρτα ἐπαφρόδιτος γενομένη μεγάλη ἐκτήσατο χρήματα. She clearly amassed her fortune by providing sexual services, and (as Sokrates' dialogue with Theodote shows<sup>107</sup>) a Greek would have had no embarrassment in recognizing this. Even if the word ἐπαφρόδιτος is (like the English plural 'charms') something of a euphemism, it surely refers here to Rhodopis' sexual attractiveness. And no doubt it is with the same meaning that, in the following section, the courtesans (ἐταῖραι) of Naukratis are described as ἐπαφρόδιτοι.

On the strength of the Herodotos passages one may explore the possibility that in Xenophon's discussions of male love likewise, ἐπαφρόδιτος means 'sexually attractive'. At the outset, it is relevant to note that it is Xenophon who provides us with two of the clearest examples of the appellative use of the goddess's name to refer to sexual desire or sexual intercourse.<sup>108</sup> In turning to the occurrences of ἐπαφρόδιτος, I take the clearer context first. In *Hiero* 1.29–38 the overall subject matter is sexual pleasure with boys, which in Hieron's view is most (possibly only) worth pursuing when accompanied by a loving response. The responses mentioned in §35 illustrate the theme, and the argument is cumulative—from glances to questions and answers and, best of all, 'struggles and quarrelling's' (μάχαι τε καὶ ἔριδες). All these exchanges are 'sweet' (ἡδεῖαι, a word which, as I have argued, takes on sexual overtones from its context). But the concluding items are characterized yet more strongly as ἡδίσται δὲ καὶ ἐπαφροδιτόταται. For the rhetoric to work, the concluding superlative must go beyond ἡδίσται, and the obvious direction is towards a more emphatic reference to sexual pleasure—the 'struggles and quarrellings' are 'most sexually stimulating'. I presume this is the intention of E. C. Marchant's translation, 'very ravishing'. Waterfield translates the word as 'erotic'.<sup>109</sup>

I would suggest that we need a play on the same meaning to make sense of *Symposium* 8.15:

ἡ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς φιλία διὰ τὸ ἀγνὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀκορεστοτέρα ἐστίν, οὐ μέντοι, ὥς γ' ἂν τις οἰηθείη, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνεπαφροδιτοτέρα, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς καὶ ἀποτελεῖται ἡ εὐχὴ ἐν ἡ αἰτούμεθα τὴν θεὸν ἐπαφρόδιτα καὶ ἔπη καὶ ἔργα δίδοναι.

The anonymous *τις* presumably supposes that a 'holy' love would be ἀνεπαφρόδιτος in the sense of lacking sexual pleasure. He frames the response of the ordinary man to Sokrates' advocacy of abstinence. In reply, Sokrates resorts to an argument of the kind he has already deployed around the word καλός in his conversation with Kritoboulos in chapter 5: 'I am καλός, but not in the sense you mean.' So the φιλία analysed in chapter 8 will, according to Sokrates, be no less erotic, no less replete with the charms of Aphrodite (ἐπαφρόδιτος) than its physically sexual counterpart: but the true meaning of the adjective (according to him) is that found in the prayer commonly addressed to Aphrodite—a petition for words and deeds of grace and charm. Thus love of the mind/personality is 'erotic', but only in the sense that

<sup>106</sup> From Homer, *Od.* 22.444, onwards.

<sup>107</sup> Xenophon, *Mem.* 3.11.

<sup>108</sup> *Sympos.* 3.1, 8.21.

<sup>109</sup> Xenophon: *Hiero the Tyrant and Other Treatises*, trans. R. Waterfield with introductions and notes by P. Cartledge (Harmondsworth, 1997), p. 12.

Sokrates claims that he himself has always been in love. The same logical ploy underlies Sokrates' summary at *Symposium* 8.18, where the question is both a challenge and an equivocation: οὐ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπαφρόδιτα,<sup>110</sup>

Admittedly, an interpretation based on a handful of instances of ἐπαφρόδιτος can hardly be conclusive when compared with the multitudinous occurrences of καλός. But the logic is the same as that in other Sokratic arguments, and the interpretation gives point to the importation of a distinctly rare word. This analysis of 'the charms of Aphrodite', I would suggest, confirms the argument that in *Symposium* 8 and *Hiero* 1 Xenophon was deliberately setting alongside one another two types of love: the Sokratic doctrine of celibate friendship as the true fulfilment of ἔρως, and the view found in discourses associated with Kritoboulos and Hieron and elsewhere in Xenophon's writings that an honourable ἔρως may include physical satisfaction within the broader pattern of φιλία, provided it is subject to ἐγκρατεία.

One may nevertheless feel a certain lack in Hieron's discourse of that concern for the beloved 'in sickness and in health' which pervades Sokrates' view in *Symposium* 8.18. In reply, it may be said that the short discourse in *Hiero* 1 is concerned with the narrow point: whether, given the nature of tyranny, a tyrant can experience the reward of true ἔρως for something he does not possess and cannot command. But, more importantly, the chapter describes the relationship between the lovers as embracing both φιλία and ἔρως. One may, therefore, expand the analysis with reference to the positive discussion of φιλία in *Hiero* 3. While this chapter makes no explicit mention of pederasty (unless such a relationship is implicit in the 'ἐταίροις πρὸς ἐταίρους' of §7), it speaks of the mutual caring of friends in language distinctly reminiscent of *Symposium* 8. It may thus be called upon to supplement the description of flirtatious love-making in the first chapter.

Nevertheless, the passages in *Hiero* 1 and 3 so far discussed share a fundamental weakness. They speak of ideal relationships which are unattainable by one who occupies the position of tyrant as Hieron understands it. Thus at the outset Hieron declares that in respect of boy-love even more than in heterosexual relationships, μειονεκτεῖ τῶν εὐφροσυνῶν ὁ τύραννος (1.29). He wants to attain his goal with the beloved, in a friendship freely given: but (as he thinks) force is inescapably in the background for all a tyrant's activities. He can therefore never be sure that the love seemingly offered to him is genuine and not hypocritical, arising from fear or self-interest.

This problem besets the tyrant in every department of life. The answer, which Simonides reveals, is that a tyrant's rule need not be oppressive. He can devote himself to the service of his people and so achieve Xenophon's ideal of 'tyranny over willing and loving subjects, which is a heaven'.<sup>111</sup> The ideal ruler here does everything required to ensure the love of his subjects (τό φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων, 11.8). He will, in consequence, be surrounded by admirers and well-wishers, and be the object not only of φιλία but of ἔρως. In Waterfield's translation:

What people will feel for you, then, is passionate love rather than mere liking. You won't have to make advances to good-looking men, but to bear with their advances.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>110</sup> A similar oscillation has already been noted in the two speeches (of Hieron and Sokrates) over the word καλός (above, p. 93). A further example of the same logical ploy is found around the word ἡδεσθαι at *Mem.* 1.3.15.

<sup>111</sup> Gray (n. 89), p. 117.

<sup>112</sup> *Hiero* 11.11: ὥστε οὐ μόνον φιλοῖο ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐρῶο ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς οὐ πειράν, ἀλλὰ πειρώμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀνέχεσθαι ἄν σε δεοί.

The immediate context recalls the opening of the dialogue, which surveys the organs of sensual pleasure, beginning with the eyes (gratified by great tourist spectacles) and ending with the genitalia. Hieron claims that his status as tyrant prevents him gratifying any of these desires. In the recapitulation at 11.11 the discussion is compressed to the first and last points: the reformed Hieron can now follow his tourist instincts wherever he wishes, without risk; as for sex, he will be surrounded with would-be lovers. But the change that makes this possible is not in his eudaimonistic goals, but in his mode of government. As Gray summarizes the main thrust of the dialogue, 'Simonides eventually shows him how he can turn his tyranny into the sort of rule that will attract love, and then he will be able to enjoy those pleasures if he wants (8–11).'<sup>113</sup> The 'reformed' tyrant will act in a beneficent manner *vis-à-vis* his subjects, and the pleasures will then accrue to him unimpeded by his status.<sup>114</sup>

But if the possibility of enjoying true love is included in the tyrant's reformation, why is the accessibility of lovers described as something to be borne or endured (*πειρώμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀνέχεσθαι ἄν σε δέοι*)? The answer must, I think, lie in Xenophon's fondness for ironic witticism, an example of which can in fact be found earlier in this dialogue, where Xenophon refers to the wild delight of the citizenry following a military victory in which they claim to have killed a greater number of the enemy than actually fell on the battlefield!<sup>115</sup> The light touch at 11.11 may indicate a certain delicacy and reticence in dealing with sexual matters, but it is essentially jocular, suggesting that so far from being unable to attain a sexual liaison of the kind he wants, Hiero will have to put up with plenty of unsolicited offers. This hints at opportunities for discriminating choice, rather than promiscuity, but does not imply abstinence from sex altogether.<sup>116</sup> Indeed, the possibility of more than one lover is probably implied in the reference to *παῖδας* in 11.14 (see below).

The tyrant's services so far mentioned in chapter 11 are in the public domain, but a more personal concern for friends and lovers is urged at the ensuing §14, which enjoins him to treat his '*παῖδας*' as his own life. Once again, we encounter ambiguity in the word *παῖς*. There is certainly rhetorical force in adding 'sons' to 'friends', but one may wonder why an exhortation to care for sons is needed when the father–son relationship has just been held up as exemplary.<sup>117</sup> A paragraph or two earlier the promise of male lovers has been held out to the good tyrant. As we have seen, Xenophon uses *παῖς* equivalent to *παιδικά* more commonly than has been generally recognized, and this seems certainly a possible, and on balance the more likely, meaning here. When, at the close of the dialogue, Xenophon comes to depict the character of the good tyrant, his male lovers are included within the scope of his beneficence.

Taken as a whole, the various references in the *Hiero* present what may be regarded

<sup>113</sup> Gray (n. 89), p. 116.

<sup>114</sup> *Hiero* 8.1, cf. 3.5.

<sup>115</sup> *Hiero* 2.16. For Xenophon's humour, cf. n. 51. Also (for the ironic twist), cf. Hindley (n. 1), pp. 355f. and nn. 38, 39. An element of humour also creeps into the Alkibiades seduction narrative, when Alkibiades complains that Sokrates's rejection had 'insulted' him (*ὕβρισεν*—usually a strong and serious term): Plato, *Symposium* 219c.

<sup>116</sup> An alternative view is hinted at in the note to Waterfield's translation (n. 3, p. 189), which suggests a possible parallel with Alkibiades' attempt to seduce Sokrates. Sokrates puts up with this, but clearly does not welcome it, and eschews any physical response. A similar attitude, it might be argued, is implicit in the moral connotation of *ἀνέχεσθαι* ('bear with') in the present passage. But to follow this route for the interpretation of *Hiero* 11.11 is to entertain a dismissive attitude to sexual pleasure which does not appear elsewhere in the dialogue and is at variance with Xenophon's view of moderate physicality (as argued for in the present article).

<sup>117</sup> This argument also rules out the possibility that the words might be a warning against family murders of the kind mentioned in *Hiero* 3.8.

as an idealized view of homosexual love. They depict a way of moderation and regard for the beloved, a combination of the physical and the ethical, which we have now seen to run through Xenophon's writings, and which, it may be claimed, was Xenophon's own view of the matter. It may be unattainable by the unreconstructed tyrant, but remains as an ideal for the ruler (and, presumably for any of his subjects) who is willing to show concern for his fellow men.

The purpose of this paper has been to explore so far as possible Xenophon's own understanding of male love. It is no accident that I have largely avoided the longest single treatment of the subject in Xenophon's writings—Sokrates' speech in *Symposium* 8. This speech has provided a foil for the way of moderation expounded by Hieron. But neither in the passage I have selected for detailed study (*Symposium* 8.12–18) nor elsewhere in the speech is there any overt endorsement by Xenophon himself of the views attributed to Sokrates.<sup>118</sup> Not only so, but (as we have seen) the evidence elsewhere suggests that Xenophon, in accepting the way of moderation, disagreed with the philosopher over the degree to which physical relationships between ἐραστής and ἐρώμενος might be acceptable. Moreover, other discrepancies are apparent between *Symposium* 8 and Xenophon's treatment of pederasty elsewhere. The swift move to concentrate on prostitution in the discussion of bodily love (*Sympos.* 8.21–22) disregards the examples of honourable love we have noted elsewhere. The discussion in *Symposium* 8 also overlooks the distinction between ἀκρασία and an ἐγκρατεία which admits (and indeed enhances) sexual pleasure, put into the mouth of Sokrates at *Memorabilia* 4.5.9. In the *Cynegeticus* Xenophon himself accepts the principle of inspiration to deeds of honour provided by the ἐρώμενος, which Sokrates rejects.<sup>119</sup>

There are then several grounds on which one might doubt the initially appealing hypothesis that Sokrates' speech in *Symposium* 8 represents a summation of Xenophon's own views. But if my thesis of Xenophon's espousal of the 'way of moderation' is to be entertained, it must face the question: why did he devote so elevated a place to a speech which uncompromisingly advocates pederastic celibacy?

The first point to be made is that, whatever the thrust of Sokrates' exhortation to Kallias, it cannot eliminate, and should not be allowed to obscure, the evidence in favour of a moderate physicality found elsewhere in Xenophon's works. The 'way of moderation' is close to that expounded by Plato's Pausanias, and must clearly be included in any account of views current in fourth-century Athens. The fact and manner of its occurrence in Xenophon's writings suggest that it was accepted by the writer himself. At the same time, Xenophon admired Sokrates greatly, and it is to the biographical purpose of the *Symposium*<sup>120</sup> that we must turn for some explanation of the space given to Sokrates' non-physical view of male love.

Xenophon clearly intends to present Sokrates as the centre of the dialogue. In nearly all respects he regards Sokrates' teaching as exemplary, and important points of convergence between Xenophon's views and the teaching of Sokrates in *Symposium* 8 can be attested from elsewhere in Xenophon's writings. Xenophon valued highly the pedagogic element in pederasty exemplified in the relationship between Cheiron, Phoenix, and Achilles. Such παιδεία presupposes a loving relationship of mutual

<sup>118</sup> The nearest approach is Lukon's concluding appraisal of Sokrates (*Sympos.* 9.1). On the other hand, traces of the 'moderate' view can be discerned (albeit dimly) in Sokrates' speech itself: *Sympos.* 8.14 (love of both body and soul) and 8.27 (growth 'out of' pederasty into friendship).

<sup>119</sup> *Cynegeticus* 12.20; contrast *Sympos.* 8.34.

<sup>120</sup> *Sympos.* 1.1.

<sup>121</sup> *Sympos.* 8.23. Cf. *Mem.* 4.1.1–5, esp. §5; *Lac. Pol.* 2.12. Xenophon's conception of Sokratic

respect, whether physically consummated (Xenophon) or not (Sokrates).<sup>121</sup> Moreover, Xenophon's comments in the *Memorabilia* support the high value placed upon ideals of public service in the latter part of Sokrates' speech in the Symposium. Xenophon would also, as we have seen, have agreed with Sokrates' teaching on the love of boys insofar as it counselled self-discipline (falling short of total celibacy). It would be wrong, therefore, to exaggerate the divergence between the Sokratic speech in the *Symposium* and what I have argued to be Xenophon's own view.

But self-control is not to be identified with celibacy, and Xenophon could not, without sacrificing historical fidelity, have suppressed the fact that Sokrates sought to divert *ἔρως* wholly away from the body and to focus it exclusively upon 'mind'. Xenophon also had a more particular reason for retaining this aspect of Sokrates' teaching in his literary creation. One of his major aims was to defend Sokrates against the charge of 'corrupting the young'—and for Xenophon 'corruption' clearly included the encouragement of unrestrained sexual indulgence.<sup>122</sup> To have introduced qualifications into the 'set piece' in *Symposium* 8 would have gravely weakened the defence. Xenophon accordingly contented himself with indirect indications of his dissent elsewhere in his writings. One might go further. For if indeed *Hiero* was written after the *Symposium*, we could justifiably read it as a recantation of those elements in the Sokratic speech which so vehemently reject the physical content of homosexual *ἔρως*.

It must be acknowledged that part of Xenophon's weakness as a philosopher (but part of his amiability as a man) is his failure always to achieve self-consistency in his writings. What I hope I have demonstrated, however, is an interest on his part in right sexual relationships between older and younger men and boys, and the articulation of a viewpoint, if not a theory, on this subject which stands in tension (and, by the time

*παιδεία* would require a separate essay, but reference may be made to two recent studies of 'education through love' in the Sokratic tradition: C. H. Kahn, 'Aeschines on Socratic eros', and D. K. O'Connor, 'The erotic self-sufficiency of Sokrates: a reading of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*' (both in Vander Waerdt, n. 2).

Kahn traces the literary history of the theme to Aiskhines of Sphettos, whose dialogues *Alcibiades* and *Aspasia* seem to have regarded not only pederastic (probably celibate) love, but also heterosexual (and presumably consummated) love, as the locus for such training. If Kahn's reconstruction of Aiskhines' fragmentary remains is correct, a striking parallel in thought structure can be discerned in comparing the latter's *Alcibiades* with Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 4.1.1–5. Both sequences move from love and companionship, through the rebuke of pride (in ability and possessions), to the need for training in virtue. One may even add to Kahn's identification of possible literary influences of Aiskhines upon Xenophon (p. 89, n. 7) the thought that the former's reference to training in horsemanship (*ibid.*, p. 90 and n. 14) may well have prompted the latter's comparison with the breaking-in of horses (*Mem.* 4.1.3). Xenophon, it seems, was appropriating from the tradition as well as from his own memory an aspect of Sokrates' teaching which he wished to commend. (On Xenophon's claims to memory, cf. D. Clay, in Vander Waerdt [n. 2], p. 42, n. 43.)

A much more extended study of a sophisticated (but seemingly non-physical) *eros* as the basis for education is to be found in O'Connor's essay. But O'Connor does not ask (nor, I think, is it relevant to his thesis to ask) whether Xenophon may not have maintained his own, more physical (but still morally structured) view of *eros* alongside the philosophical exchanges with Sokrates which he presents and the authentic interpretation of the philosopher's (paradoxically complex) virtue which he seeks to evoke.

<sup>122</sup> Cf. *Mem.* 1.2.1–2. The exact significance of the charges against Sokrates has, of course, been much debated. It is enough here to say that one element in this paragraph's description of the charges to be rebutted is making young men *ἀφροδισίων ἀκρατεῖς*. In this passage, as in Xenophon's *Apologia*, the defence lies in an appeal to Sokrates' self-disciplined character (*Apol.Soc.* 16).

of the *Hiero* self-conscious tension) with Sokrates' absolutist rejection of all genital relations between males. It may be termed a way of moderation. It embraces love of body and love of mind, in which the older respects the younger partner and what he offers. It maintains self-discipline over physical expression without denying the latter its place, and finds pleasure in a freely given (sexual) love as an ingredient in friendship. It inspires the lover to the endurance of toil and the pursuit of honour. Finally it integrates such personal ethics into an overriding (and typically Greek) philosophy of public achievement in the service of the πόλις.

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